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FOREWORD
The final report was prepared by General Dynamics Convair Division
for NASA/JSC in accordance with Contract NAS9-1603, DRL No.
T-396, DRD No. MA-669T, Line Item No. 3. It consists of two vol-
umes: (I) a grief Executive Summary and (II) a comprehensive set
of Study Results.
The principal, study results for Part II of the Space Construction
Experiment D. , finition Study (SCEDS) were developed from September
1981 through PQbruary 1982, followed by final documentation. Re-
views were presented at JCS on 17 December 1981 and 2 March 1982,
and at NASA Headquarters on 9 March 1982.
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Stocker, Tony Vasques
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John Maloney
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Bill Bussey, Les Richards,
Max Steele
Chris Flanagan, Bob Peller
Dennis Stachowitz
Bob Bradley
Jim Latham, John Martin,
Gary Reichley
Norman Gray
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Chuck Claysmith, Bruce
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Study Manager
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The study was conducted in Convair's Advanced Space Program, s
Department, directed by D. E. Charhut. The NASA/JSC COR is
Lyle Jenkins of the Program Development Office, Clark Covington,
Chief.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 SCOPE
This is the second of two volumes comprising the SCE DS Final Report, It con-
tains the detailed results of all Part II study tasks. Volume I provides an Exec-
utive Summary of the study results. This report is the final deliverable contract
data item. It satisfies the requirement for Line Item 3 (DRD MA-009T) of DRL
T-1390.
1.2 STUDY OVERVIEW
1.2.1 PART I SUMMARY. The Part I study tasks focused on the definition of
a baseline Space Construction Experiment (SCE) concept, shown in Figure 1-1
and concepts for additional suitcase experiments for Extravehicular Activity (EVA)
and Remote Muitipuiator System (RMS) construction operations to incorporate the
following characteristies:
a. Test a representative Large Space System (LSS) element. The baseline
experiment emplovs a 50m deployable low natural frequency structure. The
structure has a very low coefficient of thermal expansion, achievable through
the u qo of graphite composite materials for construction. Structural dynamic
tests provide data to be correlated with math model predictions. Minimal
ground testing is to be performed, and minimum flight instrumentation
employed.
b. Share a Shuttle mission with other payloads as a payload of opportunity.
c. Remain attached to the Orbiter througho+it the test. Jettison capability is
provided; however, the experiment will normally be automatically retracted,
restowed, and returned to earth by the Orbiter.
d. Provide options to approach proven capabilities of the Orbiter conservatively
and safely exceed proven limits to establish usable capabilities for control,
mission timelines, and critical interfaces. These options include variability of
mass moment of inertia and variable damping augmentation.
e. Exercise a variety of appropriate Large Space System (LSS) construction
and assembly operations !.utilizing basic Space Transportation System (STS)
capabilities (EVA , RMS , CCTV, Illumination, etc.) tc be correlated with
ground tests and simulations.
r
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Figure 1-1. Baseline Flight Experiment Concept
The prii,cipal Part I conclusions applicable to Part 11 are summarized in Table 1-1.
1.2.2 P ART It SUMMARY. After the conclusion of Part I, the study objectives
were expanded by NASA JSC and LaRC to place greater emphasis on the struc-
tural dynamics and controls technology aspects of the experiments and tc speci-
fically design the experiment to develop and demonstrate the technologies to meet
requirements for large space antenna feed masts. The objectives continued to
stress the development of Orbiter capabilitieri necessary to support large space
structures construction operations, including the ability to maneuver and control
large attached structures and to perform in--space deployment and construction
operations.
The Part II study activities were divided into five major tasks which interrelated
as shown in Figure 1-2. Task I further developed and defined the SCE for inte-
gration into the Space Shuttle. This included development of flight assignment
data, revision and update of preliminary mission timelines and test plans, analy-
sis of flight safety issues, and definition of l;round operations scenarios.
1-2
1-3
GDC-ASP-82-004
Table 1-1. Part I Principal Conclusioi,s
STRUCTURE
• Tetrahedral diamond cross-section truss beam best overall LSS
applicability
• Safety dictates controlled linear deployment and retraction
• Near-zero-coefficient of thermal expansion (CTE) achievable with
graphite /epoxy beam construction
• PRCS contingency loads penalize beam flexibility, cost, weight and
pak;kaging efficiency
• Semi-precision test structure less costly and allows assessment of
rattle and backlash effects
DYNAMICS & CONTROL
• DAP not challenged by baseline configuration
• Flexible base mount needed to produce low modal frequencies that
challenge the DAP
• Torque wheel actuators at beam tip provide variable beam damping
and excitation capability
ORBITER/MISSION INTEGRATION
• Flight assignment needed to confirm configuration
• Two day experiment optimum
• EVA experiments time limited
• RMS has a handling problem during jettison due to beam tip mass
PROrYPAMMATICS
•	 1984-1985 flight achievable
•	 Total payload cost: $10M
Task 2 incorporated new requirements for the flight experiment and defined
chAnges to satisfy these requirements for a large space antenna feed mast test
article as well as more detailed structural dynamics and controls experiments.
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Figure 1-2. SCEDS Part II Task Relationships
Task 3 expanded and updated the Part I preliminary program plan and cost
estimates based on the revised preliminary design data and test plan.
In Task 4, Convair provided revised SCE structural dynamic characteristics
to the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory for simulation and analysis of experi-
mental tests to define and verify control limits and interactions effects between
the SCE and the Orbiter Digital Automatic Pilot (DAP).
1-4
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SECTION 2
FLIGHT EXPERIMENT TEST ARTICLE
In SCEDS Part I a basic experiment was defined to satisfy general guidelines
established by the NASA/JSC. The baseline deployable structure test article
was selected for its applicability to numerous large space systems, including
platforms and antennas. The NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC) recognized
the potential benefits of the basic flight experiment as an evolutionary step in
developing major areas of technology for large space antenna systems. A joint
effort by JSC and LaRC was initiated to expand the objectives and detail require-
ments for the SCEDS Part II. This section presents the new SCE system require-
ments and describes the changes made to the structural test article to meet these
requirements.
2.1 OBJECTIVES AND REQUIREMENTS
Five major areas of technology investigation will be explored by the SCE program:
a. Prediction of, and inflight identification of, structural dynamic parameters
for large deployable structures.
b. Validation of inflight modal damping controls for large space structures.
c. Development and verification of technologies to meet large space precision
antenna/ feed mast requirements.
d. Confirmation of Orbiter flight control system modeling and simulation tech-
niques for predicting DAP performance with a large flexible structure
attached to the Orbiter.
e. Utilization of Orbiter capabilities to perform large space system construction
and assembly operations.
The following objectives and requirements submitted as inputs to Part II of
SCEDS expanded the area of application of the basic beam defined in the Part I
study.
2. 1.1 EXPERIMENT OBJECTIVES - STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS & CONTROL. The
detailed experiment objectives in the areas of structural dynamics and structural
control are as follows:
a. To determine the degree to which theory and ground testing can predict
flight performance with and without damping augmentation.
2-1
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b. To evaluate math modelling of large, complex, lightweight structures for
which ground test results are questionable or unattainable.
e. To evaluate system identification and state estimation algorithms on complex
lightweight structures in real space environment. Compare on-line with off_.
line methods and evaluate errors due to sensor number reduction.
d. To evaluate joint and cable damping effects in zero-g relative to one-g.
e. To evaluate control of structure interactions including concentrated local
controller effects on dimensional stability.
f. To evaluate sensor/measurement techniques applicable to low frequency
systems with low motion/deflection tolerances.
g. To evaluate deployment dynamics in zero-g vs. one-g.
h. To improve predictability of on-orbit loads on lightweight complex structures.
I. To simulate problems and phenomena expected in very large antennas of
100m class.
j. To establish correlation between ground and spaceflight tests.
2.1.2 EXPERIMENT REQUIREMENTS - STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS & CONTROL.
The flight experiment test article requirements to support structural dynamics
and controls investigations are as follows:
a. The test article shall be a many-member/many-joint deployable structure.
b. The test article shall be a low-frequency structure of minimum weight design
with a 0.05 to 0.10 Hz cantilever first mode natural frequency.
c. The test article shall have at least two closely coupled modes and preferRbly
more.
d. An instrumentation and data acquisition system capable of measuring deploy-
ment motions shall be incorporated in the flight experiment.
e. The test article shall provide excitation for the first four modes, and instru-
mentation and data acquisition for recording mode shape and frequency
response of the first six modes and attachment loads of Orbiter.
f. A means for studying the effect of joint loading shall be provided.
g. A control device (or devices) for demonstration of modal damping and critical
gain determination shall be provided.
2-2
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h. Nonlinearities shall be kept to minimum except where included as deliberate
superposition for test purposes.
I. Force and motion measurement at Shuttle interface shall be provided.
J. Tension loading (or other methodology) to vary properties for part of or
the entire mast shall be provided.
k. Measurement of Shuttle Orbiter motions shall be provided.
All but two of the above requirements were incorporated into the SCE. Require-
ment c. was investigated (see subsection 4.2.6). The capability to produce two
or more closely coupled modes was excluded from the preliminary design because
of its added cost and because these effects can be investigated through ground
tests. Requirement J. was not incorporated because techniques for varying
structural properties were not defined.
2.1.3 FEED MAST STRUCTURAL REQUIREMENTS. The structural requirements
for the feed mast test article as established by NASA/LaRC are shown below.
The goal was to achieve a mast structure which fell within size and stiffness
parameters considered appropriate for large space antenna feed mast structures.
a. Size:	 Length = 100m
Depth = 1.8 to 2.8m
b. Stiffness: Approximately 2 X 10  N-m 2
c. Tip position criteria: ± 10cm longitudinal deviation
± 10cm combined rotation/translation
d. Linear compaction ratio: deployed length 0 to 25
stowed length ° 2 
e. Test article design to withstand vernier RSC in lieu of primary RCS worst
case dynamic loading conditions
2.2 MAST STRUCTURE
The baseline structural test article selected in Part I of the study is the Convair
designed deployable tetrahedral truss with a diamond cross section. The base-
line configuration is 50m long, 1.61m x
 2.28m in depth, with a stiffness of 6.1 x
10 7 N-m 2
 in pitch and 2.936 X 10 7 N-m 2
 in roll. It has a 8.9:1 linear compaction
ratio and employs a 400 kg tip mass. It's minimum first mode bending frequency
for the rigid Orbiter-attached free-free condition is 0.20 Hz.
Potential feed mast candidates were compared before defining the feed mast test
article. The selected mast structure was then sized and analyzed for dynamic
performance.
r
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2.2.1 FEED MAST CANDIDATES. The structural candidate trades (reference
1) of the SCLDS Part I compared ten concepts. Hinged longeron concepts are
the most viable feed mast candidates. The three distinct types of hinged longer-
on structure are represented by the diamond beam, the half-diamond beam, and
the delta beam, all of which are shown in Figure 2- f , These structures are com-
pared in Table 2-1.
The diamond truss has a number of advantages which make it most suitable for
an experimental program.
a. Its low volume packaging requires less cargo space in the Shuttle Orbiter
payload bay which allows it to "piggyback" other palletized payloads.
b. Its single failure tolerant structure is an important safety consideration
because of the potential for damaging thin walled slender struts during
EV A and RMS activities.
c. The all-rigid-strut construction provides greater confidence that the struc-
tural properties will remain as modelled throughout ground and flight testing.
By changing the geometry, a diamond truss can be produced with a square cross
section. A square truss would provide approximately the same bending stiffness
in both pitch and roll, but offers no particular experimental advantage and re-
quires more material to produce.
The half-diamond truss looks attractive from the standpoint of low packaging
volume and lower cost than the diamond truss. However, to achieve the best
linear packaging ratio, the open square sections on one side would have to be
stabilized with diagonal cable members. This non-uniform cross-section may
cause torsional shape distortions in bending and provide a more complex model
to deal with experimentally.
The delta truss has the best linear packaging density potential. One bay can
be folded to a length of two times the diameter of the longitudinal member.
General Dynamics has developed concepts for this truss during previous stu-
dies and has shown it to be highly advantageous for long antenna masts where
stowage length is limited. The necessity for diagonal cables and the large
lateral packaging envelope are major disadvantages. The potential problems
with diagonal cables are as follows:
a. They have a tendancy to loop and snag. Although careful prepackaging
of cables can prevent problems during deployment, the retraction cycle
would be subject to cable hang-ups.
b. Cables reduce bending and torsional stiffnesses and strut sizes must be
increased to compensate for their tension loads.
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c. Cables are less durable and more prone to damage from human and mechani-
cal contact. Unreported collisions with cables can result in reduced strength
and tension. This may lead to untimely cable failures and unaccountable
variances in the structural model.
d. Cable tension control and verification are a major complexity in assuring
straig;itness in a long truss structure.
e. There are several technology problems associated with composite material
cables:
1. Woven or braided composite cables have a tendency to creep and relax
their tension loads.
2. Bundled fiber composite cables fracture easily in bending.
3. End terminations tend to fracture cable fibers locally, creating weak
spots. The integrity and quality of end termination joints require
special NDT techniques.
4. Packaging of cables in the folded structure must be carefully controlled
to prevent cable damage from tight bend radii or kinking.
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Table 2- 1. Comparison of Feed Mast Structural Candidates
Candidate	 Advantages	 Disadvantages
Diamond Truss
	 • Packages Flat ( Low	 • 4d Longitudinal Pack-
Volume)	 aging
• Redundant Structure
	 • Higher Cost & Weight
• Fixed Structural Proper •. 	 (More Struts &
ties	 Fittings)
• Two Rail Deployment
Mechanism
Square Truss
	 Same as Diamond Truss
Half Diamond
	
• Packages Flat (Low
Truss	 Volume)
• Lower Cost & Weight
(Fewer Struts &
Fittings)
• Two Rail Deployment
System
Same as Diamond Truss
Except
• Requires More Material
to Produce
• 4d Longitudinal Pack-
aging
• Diagonal Cables O ne Side
• Non-Uniform ^,ross-
Section Properties
• Non-Redundant Structure
c
Delta Truss
	
• 2d Longitudinal Pack-
	
• Large Packaged Volume
aging	
• Diagonal Cables All Sides
• Lower Cost & Weight
(Fewer Struts &
	
• Non-Redundant Structure
Fittings)	 • Additional Deployment
Rail & Rail Support
Structure
2.2.2 FEED MAST SIZING ANALYSIS. A decision to continue using the diamond
truss for the experiment structure was supported by an analysis to verify that
it could meet the structural and dynamic requirements for a feed mast. This is
an iterative process as illustrated in Figure 2- 2. The steps used to size the
mast structure are as follows:
a. Select truss characteristics - The factors that directly affect mast sizing
are: the diameter, wall thickness, length, and material of the struts; the
cross section dimensions; and the tip mass. These parameters define the
i
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Figure 2-2. Mast Structural Sizing Analysis Flow
strength, stiffness, and mass properties of the truss. Strut diameter and
truss geometry are selected to meet the linear packaging ratio required
(20:1 ratio was selected).
b. Composite strut loads - Truss loads are estimated for several flight condi-
tions. For on-orbit test conditions, the maximum dynamic moment and shear
loads on the structure are calculated in pitch and roll for intermediate and
fully deployed states, using a NASTRAN model of the structure and its
support system.
c. Analyze truss capabilities - Truss loads are used to compute the allowable
stresses and buckling strength capabilities of the truss struts.
d. Composite dynamic characteristics - The MSC/NASTRAN model of the struc-
ture is used to compute modal frequencies of at least the first six modes.
The above steps were iterated until an acceptable set of structural characteris-
tics was defined. The selected configuration was then input to a magnetic data
tape and transmitted to the Charles Stare Draper Laboratory for evaluating
Orbiter Digital Automatic Pilot (DAP) interactions and refined loads analysis.
The results of the CSDL analysis are not yet complete.
2.2.3 FEED MAST STRUCTURAL AND DYNAMIC CHARACTERISTICS. The
revised geometry of the diamond truss is shown in Figure 2-3. The effects of
the preliminary sizing analysis using a 250 kg tip mass are as follows:
a. Width increased from 1.E1m to 7.0m
b. Height increased from 2.28m to 2.83m
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Figure 2-3. Revised Tetrahedral Diamond Truss Geometry
c. Linear packaging ratio increased from 8.7:1 to 20:1
d. Diameter of longitudinal members decreased from 0.045m to 0.02m
e. Length increased from 50. lm to 100m
f, Number of bays increased from 31 to 50
g. Stiffness (M) in pitch decreased from 6.1 x 10 7 N-m 2 to 2.0 x 10 7 N- m2
h. Stiffness (M) in roll lecreased from 2.9 x 10 7 to 1.3 x 10 7 N--m2
The frequencies for the first six modes are listed in Table 2-2 for two different
tip masses with both flexible and rigid support. These four configurations were
submitted to CSDL to obtain comparative results on their effects on the DAP (see
subsection 4.1) .
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Table 2-2. Diamond Truss Structural Dynamic Characteristics
(Orbiter-attached Free-Free)
Mod. D ®ecrl lion Fro uwncle! Nt
1 1st pitch bend .0390 .0861 .0301 .1192
2 1 at roll bend .0618 .1138 .0533 .1322
3 2nd roll bend .6716 .9350 .8877 .9588
4 2nd pitch bend .8069 1.1783 .5116 1.2092
5 3rd roll bend 2.2825 2.8937 2.2678 2.9298
6 1 at torsion 2.7943 3.1956 2.7901 3.19,56
Tip mass (kg)	 250	 250	 100	 100
Support stiffness (n/m) 1.55 X 10 5 	 Po	 .75 X105
	
00	 02031118.90
At the end of Part 1 it was concluded that a flexible base mounting for the flight
experiment truss was the best approach to reducing the first mode bending fre-
quency to less than 0.05 Hz to provide a challenge to the DAP. Flexible mounting
of the truss may be accomplished as shown in Figure 2-4 by mounting the deploy-
ment rail and its supports on a pivoting frame suspended on flat springs for roll
flexibility. Helical springs installed in the pitch braces will provide flexibility in
pitch. This concept was further developed to install latches and actuators which
will allow the mounting flexibility to ba 14000 ked out so that truss structural dynamic
characteristics can be tested. The flex mount would then be unlocked to perform
DAP interaction testing.
I	
Steel spring
	
Dumper
r
0
Figure 2-4. Flexible Base Mount Concept
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With the trass attached to the Orbiter in a free-freo mode, it should be noted
that the modal frequencies arc higher than they would be if the structure were
attached to a fixed support. For example, with the 200 kg flip mass with the
rigid base mount, the first mode frequency would be approximately 0,008 llz
as compared to 0.080 Hz with the movable Orbiter.
2.3 FEED MAST RF REFLECTIVITY
For large communications antennas where the desired scan angles are six degrees
or less, it appears that the antenna can be designed with an offset food such
that the beam will not intersect the food mast. This is the most desirable ap-
proach because it doesn't require any modification to the selected food mast
structural arrangement. This means the best packaging/deployment arrange-
ment can be achieved for the food mast. A large offset to the food system is
the simplest approach to pursue. However, this approach can increase the
loads that the food mast must carry and henco the mass of the food mast
somewhat.
For scan angles above six degrees, it may not be effective to increase the food
offset to prevent the beam from intersecting with the food mast. For this case,
several approaches as identified in Table 2-3 would be pursued to meet relflec-
tivity requirements, but each one has major disadvantages. Each of them adds
complexity and weight to the structural arrangement of the feed mast. They
will degrade the packaging ratio and complicate the deployment operation.
They may even change the deployment approach entirely, such as the case
where plates are put on the sides of the mast and appropriate cut-outs made in
them to make the structure transparent. This arrangement may require a tele-
scopic deployment arrangement, which is less desirable than the selected ap-
proach. Additional ground testing would also be required for the feed mast test
article to make sure the modifications to the structural arrangement met the
requirements.
To allow mast RF reflectivity minimization techniques to be defined and evaluated
for incorporation into the flight experiment, further study of specific antenna
designs would be required to define regk4irements for the SCE feed mast test
article.
n $n
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Table 2-3. Feed Mast RF Interference Minimization Approaches
Options Advantages/Disadvantages
	 Applications
•	 Design antenna geo- a	 Advantages
	 Small scan angles
metry to avoid —	 Does not require 	 (1 deg - 6 dog)
interference modification of sel-
-	 F/D ected mast structural
—	 Offset arrangement
®	 Frequency —	 Beat packaging/
deployment
w	 D?sadvantages
—	 More structure/
additional mass
F_
Modify mast structural 	 •
arrangement
— Provide reflecting
geometry
Metallic reflectors
Metnllized surfaces
Inflatable reflec-
tors
— Add absorbing ma-
terial or coatings
— Make structure
transparent (Dich-
roic )
Disadvantages
— Adds complexity &
mass
— Degrades packaging
ratio of mast
viii ipucatcx
deployment /may
change deployment
method
— Requires additional
ground testing
Large scan angles
(>Q deg)
9
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SECTION 3
PRELIMINARY DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
The SCE preliminary design was changed to incorporate the new deployable
truss configuration, tip mass jettison capability, flexible base mounting provi-
sions, and the Shuttle Orbiter interfaces. Structural analysis of the deployable
truss and its deployment rails and supports was performed and the SCE mass
properties were updated. A preliminary Phase 0 Safety Analysis of the SCE
payload was also performed. This section presents the results of these design
and analysis activities..
3.1 PRELIMINARY DESIGN
The SCEDS Part I baseline concept (reference 1) was selected because it allowed
the most latitude in establishing the stowed length of the deployable structure.
The general arrangement of the payload would allow it to be integrated with a
number of alternative cargo manifests and possibly straddle other palletized
experiments such as the Materials Processing Science (MPS) pallet for maximum
utilization of cargo space.
The SCE baseline concept arrangement was retained for this phase of the study.
The preliminary design was changed as described in the following subsections.
3. 1. 1 SCE SUPPORT STRUCTURE. The SCE support structure shown in Fig-
ure 3-1 is made up of four open box beams jointed at the ends to form an open
rectangular structure. The lateral box beams support the trunnion pin inter-
faces for the active retention fittings on the Orbiter longeron sill. Within the
area bounded by the box beams, additional structure is provided to incorporate
an equipment and experiment mounting shelf and a walkway for personnel sup-
port required during EVA experiment removal. Located at the c.g. of the SCE
support structure, an RMS standard grapple fixture (Spar Part No. 51196F1-3)
is provided. This grapple fixture will allow for jettison of the SCE support
structure and payload from the cargo bay, using the RMS fitted with a standard
end effector.
A spring mounting system for the roll frame assembly is provided in the SCE
support structure. Two leaf springs reacting against the roll frame provide a
truss mounting stiffness of 1.55 X 10 5 Nm /rad . To lock the roll frame structure,
a sliding pin engages a bracket on both sides of the support structure. A
planetary gear motor, through a worm reduction gearing, drives a bell crank
which actuates a push-pull linkage to lock and unlock the sliding pins. A shear
pin located on the aft portion of the SCE support structuxa engages an active
retention pitting attached to the keel bridge of the Orbiter to react Y-Y loads.
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Figure 3-1. SCE Support Structure
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The roll frame structure is free to rotate in the lateral direction. Mounted to
this structure are two truss deployment rails and two pitch struts. Each deploy-
ment rail has an extension rail which is rotated 180 degrees for stowage. The
deployment rail supports the stowed deployable truss and incorporates the truss
deployment mechanism.
Each pitch strut has a spring cartridge that provides a truss mounting stiffness
of 1.55 X 10 5
 Nm/rad. Two compression springs (one for each direction of pitch)
react against a plunger which is part of the pitch strut mounting bracket. A
preload adjusting nut takes out any looseness in the pitch strut at assembly. A
ball detent in an annular groove in the adjusting nut locks out the flex mount
in the pitch struts. To lock or unlock the strut spring, a planetary gear moto,
with a splined shaft rotates a threaded taper pin, displacing a spring loaded
taper pin which locks or unlocks the ball detents.
The pitch struts contain an overcenter hinge mechanism that locks up when the
rail is rotated 90 degrees to the deployment position shown in Figure 3-2. A
rotary solenoid is installed on each hinge to allow the struts to be remotely
unlocked for restowage.
3.1.2 DEPLOYABLE TRUSS. The general arrangement of the deployable truss
is shown in Figure 3-3. The drawing shows the initial stage of the truss deploy-
ment with upper and lower lateral struts unfolded and the first two bays deployed.
Basically the system consists of a truss deployment rail structure with extension
rails, two motorized carriages, two electric cable take up reels, and the deploy-
able truss with a tip-mounted damping augmentation unit and mass. The rails 	 o
contain tracks for the truss and carriage rollers and gear racks for the carriage
drive pinion as shown in Figure 3-4.
To simplify the drives and controls, the RMS is used to perform the following
functions: a) rotation of the folded truss /rail assembly; b) deployment and
retraction of the two extension rails; c) rotation of the lift and holddown arm
for folding and unfolding of the upper and lower lateral struts; and d) rotation
of the overcenter hinge tripper support arms.
Linear deployment and retraction of the truss is accomplished by movable car-
riages. Each carriage contains a drive motor, a solenoid operated latching
mechanisms that unlatch the overcenter hinges of the horizontal and upper
struts during truss retraction.
The geometry for one folded truss bay is as drawn in Figure 3-4. All strut
tubes are of the same diameter. Clearances between struts and hinges are
held to a minimum to obtain the smallest package possible. A trip arm is at-
tached to each overcenter hinge. This arm is used to initiate the folding se-
quence of the overcenter hinge struts during truss retraction.
F
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A cross-section of the carpenter hinge trip arm is also shown. Rails attached
to this arm hold the carpenter hinge struts in the folded position. The arm is
rotated by RMS Universal Service Tool drive action to deploy the lateral members.
For retraction of the lateral members, the trip arm collapses the carpenter tape
hinges and folds the lateral members to the stowed position.
The end of the deployable truss is equipped with a special support frame for the
damper sets and tip mass (Figure 3-5). Six damper sets, each consisting of a
torque motor, rotor, and rate gyro sensor are mounted in a housing such that
there are two damper sets per axis. The effects of varying the damping ratio
from 0 to l% to 2% along each axis can thus be evaluated.
• Separation springs Torque wheel/rate gyro (6)
• Explosive bolt Instl
Sep. plane
Bolt catcher (2)	 \^
0203217016
Figure 3-5. Damping, Excitation and Tip Mass Assembly
Two steel bars are attached to the support frame, each by an explosive bolt.
The steel bars provide the added mass necessary to bring the total weight of
the tip package to 250 kg. However, the tip masses must be jettisoned to pro-
vide a favorable center of gravity of the experiment for payload jettison in the
event of a retraction failure of the truss. The tip masses are jettisoned by
firing Pxplosive bolts, allowing separation springs to accomplish the jettison.
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The support frame is supported at the center by two pre-tensioned cables
attached to the truss. These cables react the moment loads that will be genera-
ted by the torque wheels in the damper sets during damping or excitation opera-
tions. These cables deploy and stow with the aid of the carpenter hinge trip
rail.
3.1.3 SCE CONTROLS. The hardwire control concept defined in SCEDS Part
I was updated as shown in Figure 3-6 to incorporate the following changes:
a. The Control Unit (CU) was relocated from the Aft Flight Deck (AFD) to the
SCE support structure in the cargo bay. This change provides the follow-
ing advantages:
1. Hardwire interfaces are reduced from 194 to 54 and wire lengths between
the CU and the truss are reduced.
2. Cargo bay 28 VDC power is used. This provides a larger power source
than the AFD (0.35 vs 7 kW).
3. CU does not have to be qualified to AFD offgassing and heating
requirements.
b. The dedicated payload AFD control panel was eliminated. The Orbiter-
provided standard switch panel (SSP) will be used to control the operation
of the SCE. The Orbiter-provided active latch controls will be used for
jettison control and the Orbiter-provided cathode ray tube (CRT) display
and keyboard will be used for monitoring status and data.
c. Dual PCM outputs provided direct payload data interlevel (PDI) and pay-
load recorder interfaces. This will allow data to be recorded and/or down-
linked in real time.
d. Mechanical controls for caging and release of the flexible base mount springs
and unlatching pitch strut hinges were added.
e. Instrumentation was updated and separate units for PCM encoder and signal
conditioner were defined.
The SCE CU concept is shown in Figure 3-7. The unit is a modified version of
the CU being developed for the Shuttle/Centaur high energy upper stage. The
unit has the following characteristics:
a. Weight: ti 20 kg (maximum capacity)
ti 15 kg (for SCE)
b. Power: 45W
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Figure 3-7. SCE Control Unit Concept 	 17121764.3
c. Inputs: 16 A/D, 45 discretes
d. Outputs: electromechanical or solid state relay
e. Control unit: Z80 microprocessor, 8k of 8-bit PROM memory,
L 	 In of R Alii itt`v'TiMvey
g. CCLS compatible (Centaur Computer Controlled Launch Set a xrailable at
KSC and Factory) .
h. Series inhibits in the power control section of safing functions.
The SCE CU software is defined as that software which executes within the
SCE Control Unit. This software is used to support:
a. Ground testing at GDC, KSC, the VPF, and Cx39.
b. Ground and launch support operations.
c. Predeployment testing and operations of the experiment.
d. Deployment, retraction, and safing operations.
Based on the functions identified for the SCE, and assuming electronic computat-
tion of deployment motors and damper torque motors, the estimated memory
I	 required is approximately 1700 locations of PROM and 400 locations in RAM. TheE	
CU memory capacity provides adequate margin for SCE requirements.I	 ?,
3.2 SHUTTLE ORBITER/SCE INTERFACES
{
	
	 The interfaces and interface hardware requirements for the SCE integrated with
the Space Shuttle system were identified and defined. The power, data, control,
1	 and mechanical interfaces, as well as Orbiter provided capabilities to support
.x
the basic flight experiment, are described in the following subsections.
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3.2.1 POWER, DATA AND CONTROL INTERFACES. The following power, data,
and control interfaces have been identified as shown in Figures 3-8 and 3-9.
They are summarized as follows:
a. Telemetry and Data Services
1. Interfaced at the Standard Mix Cargo Harness (SMCH) , originating at
X 0603 (inches) .
2. PCM interfaced to P/L Data Interleaver (PDI) and P/L recorder.
3. PDI provides real-time data to ground.
4. P/L recorder enables additional recording and playback.
b. Displays and Controls
1. Interfaced at SMCH, originating at X0603 (inches).
2. Caution and warriing (if required) - hardwired interface,
3. PDI interface enables display of SCE PCM data on CRT.
4. Retention control system for Orbiter supplied latches.
5. Standard switch panel - switch commands and talkbacks.
c. Power Interfaces
1. Utilize DC power from cargo bay at X 0 645 (7kW available to be shared).
2. If available use, AFD DC power (0.35M.
A standard connector panel hard-mounted to a mid-fuselage frame, as shown in
Figure 3-10, will be used for the payload interfaces for power, data, and control
harness connections. The orbiter harnesses connect to this panel. The SCE
payload includes a set of lanyard pull-type connectors designed to separate if
connectors are a flight-qualified low-cost configuration used on Atlas launch
vehicles for staging separation of flight harnesses.
The SCE control philosophy is based on the following ground rules and assump-
tions:
a. The CU will be operated only during pre-launch checkout (C/O) and during
experiment.
b. All SCE interfaces will be checked prior to launch.
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SCE Orbiter	 Ku-band	 a Down•llnkI
S•band pm In real-time
X0603 ( Ops recorder • Only outputof PDI IsData services I recordedInterface P/Ldata PCM Network
Interloaver master signalWDI) unit processor(PMU) (NSP)
Dual I
Data & I
PCM clock P/L tape S•band FM A Record data
encoder
I ^	 t
recorder Ku-band (TDRSS compatible) and/or play.I back via RF
it I
^Serlall/F SwltGh ^l
commands
— 25 wires'Control 4	 I Std switch
unit Talk-backs V panel
25 wire •
X0645
I	 T(SSP Just
	
AFD
2shown for 28v powerP/L bay i	 reference)28v power
Interface
Figure 3-8.	 SCE Telemetry and Data Interfaces
	 11104.2
w + CWEA C&W status InputsPmcaAl lx Mom • Direct hardwired measurements
• Control & status from CU
PCM `^ Pp^	 --t SCI: PCM dataMu ^_r •	 Single Input channel
• Only used during SCE operations
lion Retention control panel
Zcont rol •	 On-orbit active sill & keel latches•	 For jettison of SCC via orbiter latches(No direct SCE avionics Interfaces)
opc •	 Control & status of latches
Std
switch
panel Standard switch panol(PIL specialist station)
nEU • SCE power commands
• Deployment/retraction commands
•	 System status talk back signals ,(28r discretes)
CRT Aft flight deck CRT displays
•	 Displays data from SCE via PDi:
— Deployment mechanism carriage & drive latch
— Structure gyro and acceleration sensors
— Status and redlines
Keyboard 11171164.1
Figure 3-9.	 Display and Controls Summary
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55-02257
228.8 R
Payload envelope
','.4 d
Mid—fuselage
frame
To Xo 1531.8
Xo 2015.02 VIEW LOOKING FWD
17121184-34
Figure 3-10. Payload Power, Data and Control Harness Interface
c. The SSP is the safing function for the CU. This includes master power
kill and the ability to enable t ^a ety-critical functions.
d. The CRT displays experiment progress data from the instrumentation and
the CU.
e. Jettison is last resort if retraction fails.
f. Payload jettison is controlled by orbiter provided functions.
The fundamental concept behind the control sequence is that the SSP is used in
a step-by-step manner to initiate individual preprogram ►ned CU functions.
Continuation to the next step is justified by the checkout and priming necessary
at that phase in the sequence as illustrated in Figure 3-11.
Failures will be assessed by the crew, with retraction being the first backout
procedure. If retraction becomes impossible, the final safing mode will be to
jettison the experiment.
The basic SSP functions .listed in Table 3-1 allow for a simple interface to the CU
while providing flexibility in the type and number of control sequences the CU
can perform. The SSP also acts as a series inhibit safing function for operations
also controlled by the CU.
In addition to the sequence and status indications on the SSP, further insight
into experiment operation can be extracted from PCM instrumentation data and
displayed on the CRT as summarized in Table 3-2. Preprogrammed CRT page
formats can be called up for display.
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Table 3-1. Standard Switch Panel Functions
SSP Status Indicators
• Truss extension (1/3, 2/3, full)
• Stopped
• Retracting-fully down
• Smart side power on
• Relay side power on
• C/O ok - start up sequence completed
• Safety arm status
SSP Initiation Control Functions
• Power on/off - CU smart side and initiates avionics c/o
• Power on /off CU relay side and instrumentation
• Erection Control Sequences (ECS)
• Stop
• Retraction Control Sequence (RCS)
• Tip mass safety jettison arm
Table 3-2. CRT Panel Control and Display Functions
Call Up Experiment Data/Status
• Deployment mechanism carriage and drive latch
• Structure gyro and acceleration sensors	 9
• Control Unit digital readout 	 0
• Status and redlines
— CU
— Structure
— Power
— Safety-tip mass
— Orbiter latch status
Caution and Warning Philosophy
• CU issues status discretes of subsystems and CU health
• CRT and keyboard used to identify/isolate failures
An in-house developed caution and warning procedure based on other Shuttle
integration studies, such as Shuttle/Centaur, is easily implemented for SCE.
The CU issues self test signals and evaluates system health. Upon receipt of
a caution and/or warning signal, the CRT keyboard is then used to call up
instrumentation on a malfunctioning subsystem and evaluate the next or alternate
procedure to be followed.
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During the experiment two crew members must work in the AM to initiate and
monitor SCE operations and to operate the RMS. Figure 3-12 shows the physical
relationships of the CRT, payload retention panel, RMS panel and the probable
location of the SSP.
Payload retention
control panel	 Rnn.q nnnoi
02032178.21
Figurq
 3-12. Aft Flight Deck Contro? Station
On-orbit operations require the use of the SSP for deployment/retraction
( function initiation) . The retention control panel is used to control those
Orbiter latches which e;Rable the jettison of the experiment during safing pro-
cedures. The CRT is used for display of back-up information for both the SSP
and retention control panel functions.
The payload specialist may opt to move from the CRT to the SSP to perform
experiment switching functions or may request the RMS operator to perform
the switch actuation function when the procedure requires it. Since the switch-
ing functions are not time critical, the most convenient method may be used.
Panels may also be relocated to some extent if necessary to enhance ease of
operation.
3.2.2 MECHANICAL INTERFACES. The SCE support structure employs a
standard five point payload retention system with four longeron attachments
and one keel fitting attachment. Active longeron and keel fittings are Orbiter
provided to allow jettison of the payload with the RMS. Standard Y-guide plates
and scuff plates are installed to ensure proper clearance between the payload
and the Orbiter structure during jettison as shown in Figure 3-13. The keel
fitting interface between the Orbiter active keel fitting and the SCE support
structure is detailed in Figure 3-14.
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Figure 3-13. SCE Payload Retention Longeron Attachment - Typical 4 Places
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Figure 3-14. SCE Payload Retention Keel Fitting
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3.3 DESIGN ANALYSIS
Analyses were performed to verify the structural capability of the nevi.
truss and truss support structures. Mass properties were also update(
incorporate the latest configuration data.
3.3.1 STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS. Deployment rail loads were computed
now deployable truss configuration with a 250 kg tip mass. Shear and
loads applied in pitch and troll were determined for the VRCS thrusters V..
case. The maximum loads summarized in Table 3 - 3 vary with deployed length
due to the relative positions of the truss deployment support rollers in the rails.
Thee maximum loads were determined to be well within the structural capability
of the rails and allowed the cross-sectional size of the aluminum rail support
struts to be substantially reduced.
Table 3 - 3. Truss Support Loads
..MP
	 Do
rail
P
Pilch strut
^	 II	 1—Exlansion
M R	I rail
Deployment
r—V R rail
 Upper
strut
Lower
strut
:Support Maximum Deployod Appilod
structure loads value longth loads
Eloment
Pitch loads MP (N•m) Vp (N)
Pitch strut Axial 430N 60 bays/ 100in 1671 18
Deployment Axial 260N 50 bays/100m 1671 18
Roll shear 405N A9 bays/98m 1620 17
moment 364N-m 34 bays/68m 878 13
non loads iVIR (N-m) VR (N)
Upper strut Axial 1065N 30 bays/60m 626 11
Lower strut Axial 646N 50 bays/100m 943 10
Deployment Axial 717N 50 bays/100m 943 10
Rail shear 21 ON 49 bays/98m 931 10
moment 121 N-m 44 bays/88m 820 10
02032170 11
Truss loads for the revised truss configuration with a 250 leg tip mass and VRCS
control moments applied by the Orbiter were determined to be very low, as seen
in Figure 3 - 15. The slender struts used in the structure were determined to be
compatible with the maximum loads indicated. The truss struts are manufactured
from either a GY70 / 934 graphite epoxy material or a Pitch 75 type fabric to
provide the high modulus in the laminated tubes ( E = 20 x 10 6
 psi) required to
minimize wall thicknesses for reduced cost and weight. The graphite epoxy
material also provides the near-zero CTE required for thermal stability of the
truss structure.
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Figure 3-15. Revised Truss Loads	 02032110'20A
3.3.2 MASS PROPERTIES. Mass properties for the revised experiment were
calculated as shown in Figure 3-16. The moments of inertia are given relative
to the Orbiter coordinates. The mass properties of the Orbiter are not included
in these tables.
The c. g. change for the fully deployed truss with the tip masses ejected is
shown for reference. With the tip masses ejected, the remaining dampers and
support still constitute a tip mass of approximately 55 kg. Ejection of the
complete tip package would lower the Z axis c.g. coordinate to 22.2 m.
3.4 SAFETY ANALYSIS
A preliminary phase 0 safety analysis of the SCE was conducted to identify the
potential hazards based on the preliminary design data. This analysis forms the
basis for identifying safety critical requirements for the experiment final design
phase and assessing the adequacy of the preliminary design in conforming to
Shuttle payload safety requirements. The Payload Safety Matrix, Hazard Lists
and Payload Hazard Reports are included in this report as Appendix A.
The preliminary SCE hazards analysis of mechanical subsystems is summarized
in Table 3-4. The two failure tolerant (2 F /T) functions that have been
identified are basically compatible with the controls subsystem concept; 1.0wever,
detail mechanical functions will require further scrutiny during the final design
to ensure 2 F/T capability.
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Figure 3-16. Revised Mass Properties
a
Table 3-4. SCE Mechanical Subsystems Hazards Analysis Summary 	 B
Ronat
Cradle &
experiments
Deployed
phase
Center of mass
(m)
Moment of inertia
(kgm2)
i	 I	 i
X y Z (Roll) (Pitch) 	 (Yaw)
1/3 19.96 0 17.17 10.74X10410.78X1041.83X103
2/3 19.96 0 26.97 6.36X105 6.37 X 105 1.83X103
Full 19.96 0 38.74 1.69X100 i .59 X i 05 1.83X  I U3Jettisontip•mass 19.42 0 27.2 7.64X10 5 7.65X10 5	1.2X103
020321416-22A
Item Weight (kg)
Tip-mass 250
Truss 177
Cradle v57
Experiments 91
Total 1,175
P ,
Subsystem Hazard group Hazard title Hazard controls
Mechanical Collison Premature beam extension • 2 F/T deployment control
Premature Jettison • Jettison latches shuttle-
provided
Premature release of rail • Structural safety factors
latches
. 2 F/T satch mechanism
Premature release of tip • Structural safety factors
mass
• 2F/T release control
Orbiter cargo bay doors • Shuttle- provided
close prematurely
RMS collides with STS • Shuttle-provided
Injury & Illness Inadvertent retraction • 2 F/T retention control
during EVA
RMS injures personnel • Shuttle provided
during EVA
Damage to space suit • Smooth all surfaces & edges
during EVA
. 2 F/T Inhibit of mechanical
motions
Loss of entry capability Payload blocks closure of • 2 F/T retraction control
cargo bay doors • 2 F/T Jettison control
3-20	 02032170.32
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The preliminary hazards analyses of electrical, material, structures and ground
support equipment are summarized in Table 3-5.
The criticality of the structure to the safety of the Orbiter points to the need for
very high standards of quality and materials controls. These items will have
substantial cost impact on the flight structure. However, they are also necessary
to achieve the modeling accuracies required for large space structures.
Table 3-5. Other SCE Subsystems Hazards Analysis Summary
Subsystem I Hazard Group I	 Hazard Title	 I	 Hazard Controls
Electrical I Electrical Shock I Personnel contact with • 28 Vdc power only
electricity
Explosion
	
Rupturing of electronic • Vent all packages
packages
Fire	 Ignition of electronic 	 • Current limiting
packages and/or	 • Explosive atmosphere
surrounding materials	 test
Temperature
extremes
Hot surface induced by
excessive current flow
• Current limiting
• Power inhibited for
EVA control
Material Contamination Offgassing of • No equipment in AFD
hazardous materials
• Eliminate ignition
Fire Flammable materials sources
support combustion
• Use nonflammable/self-
extinguishing materials
Structures Collision Failure of berm • RMS shuttle provided
structure • Beam is 1 F/T
Failure of support • Materials control
• Corrosion control
structure
• Structural safety
factors
a
Ground
	 Collision	 Loss of control during
Support	 ground handling
Equipment Structural failure
of GSE
• Analyze loading
procedures
• Loading equipment
shuttle provided
• Materials control
• Corrosion control
• Structural safety
factors
3-21
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SECTION 4
DYNAMICS, CONTROL AND INSTRUMENTATION ANALYSIS
The initial requirements for Part I of this study resulted in a preliminary design
of the experimental structure that incorporated high bending strength to accommo-
date potential failure modes in the Orbiter Reaction Control System. Cost con-
siderations .Wade it necessa,. y to assume that nominal precision in the structural
joints and minimum instrumentation approaches would be used. The resulting
structural stiffness precluded meaningful Orbiter flight control interaction
experiments and the instrumentation system did not address the issues of param-
eter identification. This section presents the results of analyses and investiga-
tion performed in response to new structural dynamic, control (both flight
control and structural control) , and identification system requirements generated
for Part II of this study.
4.1 DIGITAL AUTOPILOT /STRUCTURE INTERACTIONS
During Part I of the study, the Orbiter Digital Autopilot (DAP) rate estimator
was found to have frequency sensitive characteristics which largely determine
whether or not oscillatory motions of the experimental structure will couple into
the DAP. The DAP simulations are run at The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory
(CSDL) using structural dynamics data supplied by Convair. Using data
supplied by CSDL, the rate estimator was found to correspond to a second order
filter with a natural frequency of 0.04 Hertz and a 0.8 damping ratio.
4.1.1 CSDL SIMULATION RESULTS FOR PART I. Late in Part I, data for a
50m structure with a flexible mount was developed and transmitted to CSDL, but
the simulation results were not available in time to be included in the Part I
Final Report. The flexibly-mounted structure was 50 meters long, had a 400
kilogram tip mass, and a mounting spring constant of 1.0 x 10 5 N-m/rad. This
gave a first pitch bending frequency of 0.046 Hz and a first roll bending
frequency of 0.07 Hz for the free-free structure-Orbiter combination.
A time history from the CSDL simulation is shown in Figure 4-1. At the start of
the run a 10-degree roll maneuver at 0.2 deg/see is commanded with the phase
plane rate limit set at 0.02 deg /sec and the attitude deadband at 1.0 degree.
(The traces are for the flexible body only, before the rigid body response is
added.) Vernier Reaction Control System (VRCS) activity is indicated by the
high frequency on the Z translation trace at the top. After 60 seconds, the
rate limit is reduced to 0.01 deg/sec and the deadband to 0.1 degree. The
traces show that, during the first 60 seconds, there is some VRCS action but it
appear to have died out at the 60-second point. There are some modal oscilla-
tions, but these are decaying in amplitude.
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Figure 4-1. Interaction of Flexible Structure and the DAP
When the phase plane parameters are tightened at 60 seconds, the VRCS firings
are seen to persist and the small amplitude Y rotation (pitch) does not seem to
be damping out. Since the run is too short to fully characterize the pitch
behavior, additional investigations are required.
There is absolutely no intent to operate close to any DAP instability but rather
to achieve sufficient off-nominal operation to permit an evaluation of the
structural modeling and DAP simulation as they apply to Orbiter-attached large
space structure.
Subject to a more detailed pitch axis evaluation, the characteristics shown in
Figure 4-1 appear to be very desirable. Normal operations can be carried out
with the initial phase plane limits and the DAP behavior will be essentially
nominal, but tightening the limits challenges the DAP and provides off-nominal
behavior for the structural interaction evaluation.
4.2 EXPERIMENT MODAL EXCITATION
The SCE presents a new challenge in modal excitation in that the frequencies
are quite low when compared to past structures. Although the experimental
structure configuration has changed from time-to-time as the design require-
ments have changed, the first bending modes have consistently been a fraction
of a Hertz.
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Normalized gain
Mode 1 Mode 2 Modo 3
X	 tip 1.00 .021 0.0040
)!	 tip 1.00 0.0018 0.0001
X	 tip 1.00 0.0001 2x 10_ 8
X max 1.00 0.431 0.', 35
X max 1.00 0.033 0.0033
X max 1.00 0.0028 0.0001
g
tip 1.00 0.810 0.438
tip 1.00 0.083 0.011
0	 tip 1.00 0.0049 0.0003
11121764 21
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Vibration mode testing has commonly used eleetro-mechanical linear shakers for
excitation, but it is generally conceded that these devices are n )t useful below
2 or 3 Hertz because of stroke and/or mass practical limitFtions. Nevertheless,
the need to obtain data for evaluation of structural modeling techniques and for
evaluation of system identification techniques requires that the low frequency
modes be excited.
4.2.1 EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE EXCITATION TECHNIgUES. Three
candidate excitation techniques were chosen for evaluation- Orbiter reaction
control system (RCS) firings, a mass expulsion thruster system at the tip of the
structure, and torque wheels. A 100m structure with a 1000 kg tip mass was
selected for this analysis, based on availability of suitable dynamic data. The
Orbiter-attached structure was then evaluated for the relative response of the
first three pitch free-free bending modes. These first three modes had
frequencies of 0.072, 0. 92, and 3.0 Hz, respectively. Since the relative modal
response is dependent on the type of measurement to be made, acceleration,
velocity, and displacement were considered for both linear measurements (mode
shape) and angular measurements (slope) . The results are presented in Tables
4-1, 4-2, and 4-3.
Table 4-1. Relative Modal Excitation from RCS firing
r-
i
'Er
4-3
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PITCH MODES ONLY
Normalized gnln
Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3
X tip 1.00 0.064 01018
X tip
X tip
1.00
1.00
0.0042
0.0003
0.0004
10-5
X max 1.00 1.126 0.664
X max 1.00 0.087 0.016
X max 1.00 0.0068 0.0004
8 tip 1.00 2.12 2.12tip 1.00 0.164 0.051
0	 lip 1.00 0.013 0.0012
17121764.23
PITCH MODES ONLY
Normalized gain
Mode 1 Mode 2 Mode 3
X tip 1.00 2.12 2.12
)C	 tip 1.00 0.164 0.051
X lip 1.00 0.013 0.0012
X max 1.00 43.68 75.68
X max 1.00 3.33 1.83
X max 1.00 0.26 0.044
Q tip 1.00 82.1 245.2
tip 1.00 6.40 5.34
0	 tip 1.00 0.49 0.144
UDC-ASP-82-004	 ORIGINAL PAGE io
OF POOR QUALITY
Table 4-2. Relative Modal Excitation from Tip-Mounted Thruster
Table 4-3. Relative Modal Excitation from Tip-Mounted Torque Wheel 6
r
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All values have been normalized to the first mode. For example, in Table 4-1 the
maximum displacement (X max) of the third mode is scan to be 2 x 10° 6 times the
maximum displacement of the first mode. Thus, it appears that attempts to
gather data from the higher modes by firing the RCS and taking displacement
measurements (as might be taken by an optical system) can be expected to
present problems in extracting the third mode signal from the first mode noise.
4.2.2 SELECTION OF EXCITATION TECHNIQUES. Inspection of the three
tables indicates that the RCS tends to excite mostly the first mode, that the
thruster at the tip is somewhat better than the RCS for higher mode excitation,
and that a torque wheel at the tip is by far the best technique for providing
reasonably uniform modal excitation. Based on these results, thu RCS was
chosen as the SCE technique to excite the structure for the free decay tests
wherein amplitude-sensitive nonlinear behavior (damping) will be observed, and
torque wheel excitation was chosen for the random shake to produce multi-mode
data.
Based on the results of the preceding analysis and on knowledge of available
instruments and their applications, linear acceleration and angular rate were
selected as the parnmaters to be monitored.
4.2.3 MODAL EXCITATION WITH RCS. Although normalized data is most easily
evaluated for relative effects, absolute data is needed to determine if reasonable
amplitudes are achieved. Analysis of step firings of VRCS thrusters R5D and
L51) produced a first pitch bending maximum displacement of 0.083 meter and a
maximum second mode displacement of 0.0002 meter. Thrusters R5D and L5D
point down from the aft end of the Orbiter and produce negative pitch accelera-
tions. By terminating the thrust after half a period of first mode oscillation, the
first mode displacement would double to 0.16 meter. If additional amplitude were
desired, the process could be repeated using F5R and F5L (forward down
pointing for positive pitch accelerations) and the amplitude would again approxi-
mately double to 0. 33 meter.
The effect of firing the Primary RCS (PRCS) is also of interest, provided
excessive structural loads are not induced. Using an effective thruster-on time
of 0.020 second to determine the minimum impulse bit (MIB) , it was found that
simultaneous MIBs from PRCS thrusters F1U, F2U . F4D , and L4D produced a tip
displacement of 0.25 meter (thrusters F1U and F2U fire upward from the front
end and ND and L4D fire downward from the aft end) . All four thrusters
produce negative pitch acceleration. It is tentatively concluded that very
limited PRCS MIB operations can be carried out without producing excessive
experiment structural bending, pending CSDL loads evaluation.
4.2.4 MODAL EXCITATION WITH TORQUE WHEELS. Actuation or "muscle" for
control and excitation in space at low frequencies can be provided by torque
wheels. Figure 4-2 shows the relations for a simple do motor where.
I4-5
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L	 is the inductance in henries
R	 is the resistance in ohms
KT is the torque constant in the ft lb per amp
K 13	 is the back of em£ constant in volts/rad/see
J	 is the rotor moment of inertia in slug-ft-sq
s	 is the Laplace operator
The wheel can saturate speed-wise when the back em£ cancels the applied
voltage such that currant (and torque) drop to zero. This is exhibited in the
torque/voltage frequency by a low frequency roll-off. Using the block diagram
of Figure 4-2 to solve for the break-point or corner of this roll-off, it can be
shown that the corner frequency occurs at KBKT/(JR) rad/sec. Thus, by
increasing the rotor moment of inertia, J, the low frequency performance can
be achieved. Using motor parameters of KB = 0. 11, KT = 0. 114, and R = 1. 6,
a 0.048 Hz corner can be achieved with a J of 0.027 slug-ft-sq. This corresponds
to an 8.0 inch diameter rotor weighing 16 pounds.
Volts	 I 	 Amps
LS+R	 KT
Kg	 Rotor speed	 I
JS
Torque
17121794.14
Figure 4-2. Torque Wheel Block Diagram
4.2.5 JOIN'., CLEARANCE EFFECTS. The effects of joint clearances in pro-
ducing measurable backlash (accumulated clearances) were discussed in Part I
of the study (reference 1, subsection 3.2.19). The Part II a zero backlash
structure is required to ensure the tip position accuracy needed for large space
atnenna feed masts.
In the technology of large deployable structures the ability to control and
predict the joint clearance effects on damping and nonlinear vibration behavior
of structures in space is essential. It is, therefore, desirable to conduct an
experiment wit:1 the SCE that will validate this technology. This could involve
inducing clearances in a sufficient number of joints at the conclusion of all other
structural dynamic and control tests.
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A concept for unloading the interference fits in a number of the test truss
joints is shown in Figure 4 - 3. The eccentric pins in an expandable bushing
would maintain zero clearance fit in each test joints until the pins are rotated
either by remotely activated cables or by manual EVA action. The truss would
initially be excited in the first pitch bending mode by firing the RCS thrusters.
The free decay characteristics of the structure would be measured for a sufficient
period of time to establish a damping ratio. After unloading the test joints this
test sequence would be repeated to obtain comparative results.
Joint clo ranco effects
• Accumulative truss backlash
• Contributes to damping
— Sliding friction
— Impact energy
— Air compression
Joint unloading concept
4Rotato to
Increase	 Manual or
Joint	 rtooed operation
cloerance
Install in
3 .4 cluators(16 .24 Joints)
Eccontdo
pin
;xpanduble
ushlno
Figure 4-3. Joint Clearance Effects Test Concept
4.2. G CLOSELY SPACED COMPLEX MODES EFFECTS. Since a mast will have a
sparsely populated modal spectrum, a "feed array" platform concept was designed
to provide the modal density which is typical of antenna i. 'lector 's. Based on
experience with the Convair experimental control platform, a simple platform can
be designed with two closely - spaced modes at about 0.2 Hz and three closely-
spaced modes near 0 . 7 Hz, Thus, the frequencies of a large reflector could be
¢	 matched but the masses and mode shapes would be different.
7	 The simple platform would be attached to the tip of the mast as shown in Fig-
ure 4-4. The platform would fold for stowage and be deployed by the RMS.
j	 Dour torque wheel damper sets would be installed on the platform to permit
!t
multi-modal excitation for test and post excitation modal damping.
ii
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Figure 4-4. Feed Array Platform Concept 17+21164.42
4.2.7 SUMMARY OF CONTROI, AND DYNAMICS EXPERIMENT OPTIONS. The 	 0
approaches considered thus far provide the capability to address a number of
structural dynam-ic and control issues. In Table 4-4, checks indicate areas of
investigation, circles indicate a selected approach. A yaw maneuver was not
selected since there appears to be no problem in that axis (this should be
confirmed by future simulations) . Sinusoidal torque wheel excitation has not
been selected since searching out a single mode can be extremely time consuming.
Investigation of closely-spaced complex modes with the "feed array" platform
structure has not been selected since closely-spaced mode issues can be
addressed on the ground.
4.3 INSTRUMENTATION
The SCE will be instrumented to measure the parameters necessary to identify
and accurately quantify mode shapes and modal frequency response of the first
six modes of the test truss attached to the Orbiter in space free flight. This
will require measuring linear and angular displacements and rates at selected
stations along the structure as well as Orbiter motions and the relative motion
between the structure and the Orbiter interfaces. The linear displacement of
the tip of the test truss relative to the base of the truss will also be measured to
verify the precision with which relative tip motion can be maintained.
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'fable 4-4. SCE Control and Dynamics Options
Structural Dynamic and Control Issues
Control Identification
Linear Nonlinear DAP Device and Control of
Excitation/Test Method Dynamics Behavior Interactions Demo Complex Modes
Orbiter Maneuvers (ACS)
Pitch ',
Roll 3 3 3 3
Yaw 3 3 ►^' 3
Torque WhF31 Random G Q
Shake
Sinusoidal Torque Wheel ^'' 3 3
RCS on Mast Tip 3 3
"Feed Array" Structure ,i V, 3
Variable Joint Clearance a
Q Selected Options.
4.3.1 MODE SHAPE INSTRUMENTATION. Mode shape instrumentation is
required for evaluations of structural modeling accuracy and for the generation
of system identification data.
Since acceleration is related to mode shape (displacement) by frequency
squared, the low frequency modes of the fully deployed truss structure will hay.
small accelerations and require precision servo accelerometers. The partially
deployed test configuration will have higher frequencies so the frequency .,
squared effect will permit use of less costly accelerometers such as piezoelectric.
The first step in establishing mode shape instrumentation is to define the
quantity and installation location of the servo (force balance) accelerometers.
The placement of piezoelectric accelerometers must await further definition and
analysis of the partially deployed structure. The servo accelerometers are
required to measure the small accelerations of the first modes: they are more
sensitive and more expensive than the piezoelectric units. The repeatability
of the servo devices is commonly expressed in micro g's whereas piezoelectric
repeatability is in the milli g range.
The mode shapes for the first three pitch bending modes of the structure are
shown in Figure 4-5. Although the Orbiter is quite massive when compared to
the structure, it does respond enough to change the first mode from the
classical cantilever shape. The instrument placement shown covers all maximums
and provides two measurements at all nodes (zero displacement) except the very
shallow node of the first mode. Two measurements near a node permit interpola-
tion to more accurately locate the node point.
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Figure 4-5. Pitch Bending Mode Shape Instrumentation
Figure 4-6 shows the roll bending modes. Since the Orbiter roll moment of
inertia is much smaller than the pitch inertia, the first roll bending departure
from classical cantilever is more extreme than for the pitch axis. The second
and third modes in both roll and pitch are very close to cantilever behavior.
Using the same stations along the structure for the roll axis instruments as
were used in pitch, all maximum displacements are measured and all nodes have
two measurements.
In addition to accelerometers to measure the mode shape (translation) , rate
gyros are needed to define the modal slope ( angle) at the excitation input point.
Since torque at the tip of the structure has been selected for excitation, slope
at the tip is required to determine the modal response in generalized coordinates
which is used, in turn, to calculate the mode shape coefficients. The torque
wheels will have colocated rate gyros for active damping feedback. These same
rate gyros will be used for slope in.-trumentation since they are already in the
proper location.
Three additional rate gyros, one in each axis, are installed at about 78 meters
above the base to provide additional slope data for the low frequency modes
where the accelerations will be small as compared to the higher frequency modes.
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Figure 4-6. Roll Bending Mode Shape Instrumentation
4.3.2 TIP MOTION INSTRUMENTATION. Large antenna feed mast technology
requires that the tip of the structure be within 10 cm of its nominal position.
Concepts for determining the location of the tip are shown in Figure 4-7 and
are described as follows:
a. Transverse and torsional displacement measurements.
Concept 1, CCD Camera System. A long focal length lens is attached to a
CCD camera and mounted at the base of the structure. This camera views
a passive target mounted at the far end of the beam. The position of the
image of the target on the CCD array can be determined using simple image
processing techniques and this information can be used to calculate the
position of the beam tip in a plane normal to the optical axis of the camera.
Using a 1000 mm focal length lens, the CCD array will view a rectangular
area approximately lm x 0.65m at the end of the beam. The position of the
target can be found within 0.5 cm using current CCD arrays. The design
of this system will involve studies to find techniques for minimizing camera
tilt effects, trade studies on the merits of intensified CCD cameras and the
development of image processing algorithms to calculate the target position.
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Concept 1 — Transverse & Torsional Displacement
Target
illuminator	 Target
/\/\/N/N-	 \11\A\Z grid
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or TV camera will)
telephoto Ions & automatic
signal processing
Concept 2 — Transverse & Torsional Displacement
a _—,Laser & columnating optics Detector array
& signal processor(RF or hardwlro
downlink)
Concept 3 — Longitudinal Displacement
—Laser ranging unit 	 }^
^^ l I	 \Retroffectors
N -_N^	
- - -
268.687.13
Figure 4-7. Tip Motion Measurement Concepts
Concept 2, Laser/Detector Array System. A laser (probably a laser diode)
and a beam expanding telescope are mounted at the base of the structure.
The laser beam is directed along a fixed direction and it intercepts a
detector array mounted at the far end of the beam. The array consists of
a large number of independent silicon photo-diodes mounted on an area
approximately one meter square. The signals from the detectors are
decoded by the signal processing electronics to determine the position of the
beam on the array.
A modification of this technique is to make a small array and put some type
of beam steering mechanism on the laser source. The laser beam is moved
until it is centered on the detector array and the beam tip position is
calculated from the pointing direction of the laser.
b. Longitudinal displacement.
Concept 3, Conventional Laser Ranging System is mounted at the base of
the structure. These instruments are available from several companies and
they are presently used for surveying. The target for the ranging system
is a number of retroreflectors mounted at the tip of the beam. The range
to the target can be measured within 0.3 mm. The only required modification
of the laser ranging system is to make it space qualified.
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c. Transverse torsional and longitudinal displacement. These measurements
could be easily combined by mounting a steering device on the laser ranging
system. The pointing direction of the sensor when it sees the target can be
used to calculate the transverse position and the normal ranging output
provides the longitudinal position.
4.3.3 MEASUREMENT OF ORBITER MOTIONS. The planned on-orbit capability
to measure Orbit.ar motions for the SCE flight time frame consists of a calculated
state-vector updated at approximately 6.25 Hz. This capability is required to
support advertised payloads navigation update, but the sample rate will probably
not provide adequate resolution for the SCE tests.
The raw data from the Orbiter rate gyros will be available in downlist. This will
require an off-line ground support system to format the data into pitch, yaw
and roll rates.
4.3.4 FORCE AND MOTION ME ASUREMENTS AT ORBITER INTERFACE. Force
and rotation measurements at the Shuttle Orbiter/SCE interfaces may be measured
directly at the trunnion pins provided for the standard five point retention
system of the SCE shown in Figure 4-8. Pin loads would be measured by strain
gauges attached to each pin while pin motions would be measured with linear
potentiometers, provided such motions prove to be significant.
The roll braces and pitch braces would also be instrumented with strain gauges
or load cells. This loads data would allow the deflections of the support structure
to be computed from its structural model. However, static ground tests of the
support structure are recommended to validate its model.
;es
z
^x n
cd1	 s
GDC-ASP-82-004
OF POOR Q4JlWTV
Figure 4-8. Forces at the Orbiter Interfaces
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SECTION 5
PRELIMINARY SYSTEM TEST PLAN
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The Space Construction Experiment (SCE) is a basic early Shuttle flight experi-
ment that will develop and test the capabilities of the Space Shuttle system to
support construction of large spare systems. The basic SCE will consist
primarily of a large deployable structure equipped with controls, instrumentation,
and representative subsystems elements to allow testing of Orbiter control during
and after construction, construction operations using basic Orbiter capabilities,
and predicted dynamic behavior and control of a large deployable structure
attached to the Orbiter.
The SCE will be integrated into the Shuttle as a secondary payload of opportunity.
Flight testing is to be performed on a non-interference basis with primary pay-
loads.
5.1.1 PURPOSE. The purpose of the System Test Plan (STP) is to provide the
policies, plans, and overall requirements for the testing to be accomplished for
the SCE program. The STP encompasses all levels of testing to be performed in
the SCE program. This includes development testing, qualification testing,
acceptance testing, flight certification testing, ground operation testing, and
flight test operations and instrumentation.
5.1.2 GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS. The SCE test program shall be
conducted in accordance with the following round rules and assumptions:
a. Only one SCE test article will be produced for ground and flight testing.
b. Major ground simulation tests are planned using LaRC and JSC facilities.
c. The SCE support structure interface test will be conducted by LaRC.
d. Flight certification testing will be primarily performed at the system level to
minimize the cost of verifying overall flight worthiness of the experiment.
e. Major flight certification tests are planned using JSC facilities.
f. The flight test operations will be conducted aboard the STS Space Shuttle
Orbiter.
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5.1.3 TEST PROGRAM SUMMARY. The test program flow diagram (Figure
describes an orderly progression to meet the SCE program objectives and
requirements. This test program is required to assure the performance of
flight experiment hardware and to verify the technologies required to accurately
predict flight test performance of the structure, structural damping subsystem,
Orbiter flight controls and manual construction and repair operations in space.
5.5	 5.6
	 5.7
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Figure 5 -1. SCE Test Program Flow Diagram
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The development testing phase will allow system manufacturing and design
problems, and math modeling uncertainties, to be evaluated and resolved during
the design phase. The component qualification testing will verify that no critical
weaknesses exist before subsystem and system level tests are initiated. The
flight certification tests will verify the flight worthiness, environmental com-
patability, and functional capability of the integrated SCE.
5.2 DEVELOPMENT TESTS
Development testing for SCE is planned to provide early solution to manufacturing
and design problems, and to identify key characteristics of hardware. Materials,
components, and subassemblies will be tested in progressive stages to ensure
earliest recognition of possible problem areas.
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Adapting existing flight-qualified torque wheels and rate gyros to this applica-
tion will be a long-lead-time consideration. Manufacturing of the deployable
truss will be a major cost driver and will require some technology development to
achieve a cost-effective precision design.
Structural tests utilizing a 5-bay truss segment will ensure compatibility of the
final truss design with the operational environment. It will also allow structural
dynamics characteristics to be measured for verification and refinement of the
math model for full-scale assembly performance predictions .
5.2.1 MATERIALS TESTS. Truss tube and fitting composite material specimens
will be tested to measure mechanical properties and outgassing characteristics.
Preproduction tube specimens and node fitting material test coupons will be
tested to establish longitudinal and transverse tensile strength, compression
strength and modulus; shear strength and shear modulus; and coefficient of
thermal expansion (CTE) characteristics over the full range of operating temper-
atures. Truss composite materials, adhesives, bonding agents and other non-
metallic materials will be tested or otherwise verified to be in accordance with
Space Shuttle payload requirements for toxicity, outgassing, and vacuum
stability.
5.2.2 COMPONENT TESTS. The following component tests will be performed:
a. Component Tests to Support Structural Dynamic Modeling. Structural com-
ponents to be tested are shown in Table 5-1. The basic information which
Is required to simulate each component consists of the axial spring rates of
the struts and braces, the cross-sectional moments of inertia of the deploy-
ment rails, a stiffness or flexibility matrix for the joint fittings, and the
weight of each of the components. With the exception of the moment -of-
inertia, each of these characteristics can be measured statically. Measure-
ments of the concentrated masses will include the mass moments-of-inertia
about the three basic axes. Sufficient quantities of each strut and node
fitting configuration will be tested to establish a statistical population of
values.
Table 5-1. Structural Components to be Characterized
Item	 Tests and Measurements
Struts
Node Fittings
Pitch Brace	 Spring rates and
Roll Braces
	
mass properties
Tip Package
Deployment rail moment of 	 Free-free vibration response
inertia
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Cross-sectional moments of inertia are not directly measurable quantities and,
thus, they must be obtained indirectly. A compar&tively easy mathod of
obtaining these parameters is to support the beam un wires located at or
near the nodal points of the first free-free mode and then shake the beam to
excite this first mode. Using the first frequency thus obtained, the cross-
sectional moment-of-inertia may then be calculated.
b. Truss Strut and Node Fitting Assemblies Tests. Preproduction samples of
each truss strut configuration and node fittin(p
 configuration will be subjected
to a series of tests as follows:
1) Joint coupling effects of each pin joint configuration will be performed to
measure joint behavior under static and dynamic loading conditions in
the expected environment of temperature cycling and vacuum. Zero free
play, thermal conductivity and electrical conductivity across each joint
and hinge will be evaluated. Node-to-node thermal stability will be
measured for conformance to near-zero CTE requirements. Joint swiveling
torques will be measured. Bonded joint integrity will be verified.
2) Buckling stability and post bucklin g
 strength of each strut configuration
will be measured. Strut specimens will be tested to failure in tension
and compression.
3) Node joint ultimate strength tests under representative loading con-
ditions will be performed on samples of each node fitting configuration.
c. Damper Set Tests. An engineering test article of a torque wheel actuator
assembly will be assembled using a space qualifiable torque motor and rate
gyro and connected to a simple control system. Damping performance of
low modal frequencies will be evaluated using a simple cantilevered beam.
5. 2.3 SUBASSEMBLY TESTS. The prediction of the dynamic response of the
SCE requires the development of a finite element simulation of the system. This
digital model may then be used to predict the dynamic response of the system
due to excitations such as the forces and moments generated by the vernier
reaction control system. MSC/NASTRAN is the basic finite element system which
will be used and is basically a structural simulation made up of elements such
as bar, tubes, rods and concentrated and distributed masses. In order that
confidence may be gained in the adequacy of th:.s digital model to simulate the
"real world," it is necessary that ground tests be accomplished which verify this
simulation.
^s
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Upon completion of the component tests, the next step is a vibration test of
a separately manufactured segment of the SCE truss. The test truss will be
mounted vertically as a cantilever and excited with electrodynamic shakers over
a frequency range of essentially zero to 25 Liz as shown in Figure 5-2. Natural
freq ueneies and mode shapes will be obtained and compared with the eigenvalues
and eigonvoctors which will be obtained from a finite element analysis of the
truss segment. Use will be made of the component tests in assembling this finite
analysis simulation and the total procedure will be a step in gaining confidence
in the ability to predict modal frequencies and mode shapes of the full flight
article.
r,.
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Figure 5-2. Truss Segment Test
At the conclusion of the dynamic testing a load fixture will be installed on the
upper end of tho truss segment. Static proof loads will be applied axially in
each direction then torsionally in each direction. Static loads and truss tip
deflections will be measured. Strut loads will be measured by attached strain
gauges. This test will demonstrate the ability of the truss to withstand pre-
dicted flight structural loads, correlate axial and torsional stiffness results
with that predicted by the structural model and evaluate strain gauge measure-
ment techniques for strut loads.
5.3 COMPONENT QUALIFICATION TESTS
Component qualification testing is intended to assure the success of subsequent
subsystem, system, and flight testing. All test specimens will have successfully
completed a functional checkout and acceptance testing including burn-in (if
required) before qualification testing.
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Environmantal qualification test requirements will comply with JSC-07700,
Volume XIV (Revision G, September 26, 1080), "Space Shuttle System Payload
Accommodations." All newly designed components will be qualified and existing
qualified components will be reviewed and retested as required to ensure full
compliance with Shuttle requirements. Components environmental testing will be
minimized by performing major tests at the integrated system level during T'l E;ht
Certification Testing to preclude numerous individual component and subassembly
tests.
Qualification tests are sumarized in Table 5-2.
Table 5-2. Component Qualification Test Program Summary
Vacuum
or
Ambient Thermal
Operating Vacuum Vibration Acoustic EMC Shock
Damper Package X X X X
Deployment Carriage X X X
Control Unit X X X X X X
Tip Mass Ejector X X X X X
5.3.1 DAMPER PACKAGE. The damper package, consisting of six torque wheel/
rate gyro actuators will be functionally tested in ambient conditions to set up the
phasing. The package will be tested for EMC and subjected to a functional
thermal vacuum test and vibration test.
5.3.2 DEPLOYMENT CARRIAGE. The deployment carriage will be run through
a long series of operating cycles in thermal vacuum to confirm its durability and
reliability. It will also be tested for EMC.
5.3.3 CONTROL UNIT. The control unit and CU software will be functionally
tested by supporting the damper and carriage tests. It will also be vibration
tested, acoustic tested, EMC tested and shock tested.
5.3.4 TIP MASS EJECTOR. The tip mass ejector will be functionally tested in
both ambient and thermal vacuum environments. The unit will be demonstrated
in the vacuum environment after being subjected to vibration and shock testing.
EMC testing will also be performed.
5.4 COMPONENT ACCEPTANCE TESTS
Component acceptance tests are formal tests required to demonstrate that the
hardware and associated data is in compliance with specifications and ready for
r..
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delivery to NASA or for qualification test. These tests are designed to detect
deficiencies in workmanship, material or quality. They are normally nondestruc-
tive in nature and performed on all deliverable units. They include functional
testing and may include environmental testing if necessary to verify performance.
5.5 INTEGRATED SYSTEM TEST
System tests performed after final assembly and checkout of the integrated SCE
and before final acceptance test, are described below.
5.5.1 AVIONICS SYSTEM INTEGRATION TEST. Avionics system integration
and evaluation test will be performed to demonstrate functional compatibility
between the Control Unit, drive latch solenoids, carriage drive motors, caging
drives, damper sets, sensors, PCM encoder, and all other Avionics data, power
and control interfaces. This test will demonstrate and validate the CU software.
5.5.2 PARTIAL DEPLOYMENT/RETRACTION TEST. Repeated partial deploy-
ment and retraction tests will be performed to evaluate the effects of deployment
rates and accelerations on the behavior of the deployment drive mechanisms and
tha truss
 structure.
With a counterweight rigged to counteract the weight of the tip mass, the truss
will be vertically deployed two full bays, then fully retracted. Drive rate
profiles will be varied until an optimum performance is achieved.
5.6 SPACE CONSTRUCTION EXPERIMENT ACCEPTANCE TEST
Prior to acceptance and delivery of the Space Construction Experiment and
associated end items, a eeries of formal acceptance tests will be conducted.
These tests will be witnessed by the NASA and will culminate upon delivery of
test data demonstrating performance of equipment to prescribed test specifications.
After final integrated system testing, the acceptance test will include, but not
be limited to the following identified tests.
5. G.1 FULL DEPLOYMENT /RETRACTION TEST. Tests of the deployable truss
and deployment/retraction mechanism will be conducted in the horizontal position.
Deployment and retraction will be with the aid of support dollies on low friction
rollers. The truss will be fully deployed and fully retracted three times.
Electrical interface compatibility tests will be performed on the Power, Teiemetry,
and Data Services, and Displays and Controls interfaces. The commands to the
Control Unit will be by the portable switch panel throughout the test. Monitor-
ing of all applicable parameters will be provided by the contractor.
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5.6.2 SUITCASE EXPERIMENT FIT CHECKS. With the truss fully deployed,
prior to the final retraction test, the suitcase experiment hardware will be
installed oa the structure to demonstrate the fit-up and interface compatibility
of the experimental hardware with the truss structure. The experimental
hardware will be removed prior to final retraction.
5.7 GROUND TESTS AND SIMULATIONS PLAN
A simulation and ground test program plan which would fully develop modeling
techniques for flight performance predictions would include the elements shown
in Figure 5-3. The initial structural dynamics model will derive data on struts,
joints, fittings, mass properties, etc., from the component tests. The model will
be tested by performing subassembly tests of the modeled 5-bay structural
segment. Structural interface tests of the flight experiment support structure
will allow interface deflections at the base of the truss to be computed from
measured flight loads. Deployment tests and dynamics and controls tests will
allow the structural dynamic and control models for the flight test article to be
evaluated and provide a data base for evaluating the effectiveness of ground test
of partially
 dpnlgyed configurations in ensuring accurate flight test performance
predictions.
5.'.1 DEPLOYMENT TEST. The deployment test will evaluate the effects of
dep'.ayment rates and acceleration on the behavior of the structure and to
finalize the functional operating parameters for the deployment /retraction
mechanisms and controls in a simulated zero-g condition. The test will consist 	 P
of varying drive rates and rate profiles and measuring the loads and disturbances
in the truss structure. The test fixture as shown in Figure 5-4 will consist of
a synchronized deployable suspension system. The suspension cables will be
translated in unison with the truss structure by using a truss deployment
carriage digitally contralled by the control unit.
5.7.2 STRUCTURAL DYNAMICS AND CONTROL TEST. The partially deployed
structure (Figure 5-4) will be used to conduct a series of dynamic and controls
tests. For a horizontal excitation it is necessary to ensure that the pendulum
frequency of the zero-g suspension cables is well below the lowest modal
frequency of the structure. This limits the length of structure that can be
tested, unless very long suspension cables can be accommodated at the test
facility.
The approach used for the structural dynamics ground test will recognize that
the suspension will be part of the ground test dynamic system. Adjusting the
model of the entire system to match test results should give the pronee'r > "ss and
stiffness matrices for the flight structure. The deployed structure v.."_', also
provide an opportunity to check out active damper performance and component
installation.
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The test will be performed on a 1/3  deployed truss, which is the initial deployed
length that will be tested during flight test operations. A modal survey in the
horizontal plane will be performed using the damper set torque wheels for excita-
tion. Following excitation tests the damper sets will be activated and damping
performance evaluated. The dynamics and controls tests will be performed in
each of two planes by rotating the truss 90 0 about the longitudinal axis after the
first test.
The dynamic model will include the suspension and gravity effects on the
structure. Test results will be used to adjust the structural dynamic model as
required to predict on-orbit dynamics.
5.7.3 STRUC T URAL INTERFACE TEST. The SCE support structure will be
installed in a rigid test fixture with simulated Orbiter retention fittings to retain
the structure at its five trunnion pins. A rigid load fixture will attach to the
SCE support structure at all of the deployable truss attach points. The flexible
base mount mechanism will be tested both in the locked out mode and the unlocked
mode.
Force input and deflection will be measured at each of the truss attach points in
real time along with the trunnion pin loads and motions while moments are applied
to the load fixture about the pitch, yaw, and roll axis. The loads and deflections
data will be used to generate a stiffness and/or flexibility matrix for the finite
element simulation of the SCE.
5.7.4 EVA/RMS GROUND TESTS AND SIMULATIONS. The EVA and RMS ground
tests and simulations will be conducted in two phases. One-g tests and simula-
tions will be performed on the SCE installed in the JSC Manipulator Development
Facility (MDF) . Water bouyancy zero-g simulations and tests on a test segment
of truss in the JSC Weightless Environment Training Facility (WETF) .
5.7.4.1 MDF Testing. The objectives of the MDF one-g tests and simulations
are as follows:
a. To verify the compatibility of the RMS /SCE deployment interfaces and actions.
b. To evaluate and refine EVA/RMS tasks and sequences in performing the
flight test space construction experimer
c. To evaluate special RMS tools and suitcase experiment hardware, human
factors, and system compatibility.
d. To develop flight test procedures and initial timelines.
e. To train the SCE flight test personnel.
5-10
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With the SCE installed in the MDF as shown in Figure 5-5, the flight test crew
will perform the prescribed flight EVA/RMS test activities.
^l	
02032178•30
	
D
Figure 5-5. MDF Tests and Simulations Concept
These inclu:le:
a. RMS aided deployment exercises
b. EVA test equipment unstowage and work station set-up
c. RMS-astronaut handoff and equipment transfer operations
d. Experiments installations
e. Experiments removal
f. Test equipment restowage
g. RMS /EVA aided truss restowage operations
h. Contingency emergency operations
The task sequences will be worked out and problems resolved through practice
f	 exercises on the partially deployed truss to determine the most effective and
efficient procedures to follow.
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5.7.4.2 WETF Testing. The objectives of WETF water bouyancy zero-g simula-
tions and tests are as follows:
a. To evaluate the probable effects of zero-g on SCE flight test EVA personnel
behavior, performance, and endurance for correlation with flight test results.
b. To evaluate potential space illumination and shadow effect; on EVA personnel
Performance and establish illumination techniques and procedures for flight
tests.
c. To determine water-space correlation factors and update flight test timelines.
The five-bay test truss segment used for the subassembly tests will be modif4,ed
and installed in a support fixture to allow EVA work stations to be set up for
the bouyancy tests as shown in Figure 5-6. The construction experiments will
each be installed using a diver to simulate RMS handoffs to the crew member
performing the tasks. The designated crew member and at least one back-up
crew member will be evaluated. Alternative sequences and illumination techniques
will be evaluated. Final procedures will be worked out and run through in
sequence several times to acquire performance measures for correlation with
flight tests. Performance evaluation will be based on crew member self-evaluation
and observer-evaluations of recorded video tapes of test operations.
02032178-42
Figure 5-6. WETF Simulations and Test Concept
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5.8 FLIGHT CERTIFICATION
pli
TEST
The Flight Certification Test of the Space Construction Experiment will be
performed at Johnson Space Center (JSC) in the test sequence as shown in
Figure 5-7. 11
EVA/RMS
	
i
&	 EMC ACOUSTIC	 RANDOM	 THERMAL
SIMULATION VIBRATION	 VACUUM
JSC JSC
	 JSC	 JSC
MANIPULATOR ACOUSTIC TEST	 VIBRATION LAB	 THERMAL
DEVELOPMENT FACILITY (GVL)	 (GVL)
	
VACUUM LAB
FACILITY
(MDF)
266.687.6
Figure 5-7. Flight Certification Test Sequence
The test objective is to demonstrate that the SCE including truss, cradle and
stowed experiments will function satisfactorily after being subjected to Shuttle
flight environments. The tests include the EMC test conducted at ambient
conditions, followed by Acoustic test, Random Vibration test and Thermal
Vacuum Test.
U.9 GROUND OPERATIONS PLAN
The general plan for SCE ground operations to be conducted at KSC during both
pr etlight preparations for launch and subsequent postflight activities after
landing is described in the following subsections.
5.9.1 PREFLIGHT GROUND OPERATIONS AT KSC. Initial preflight operations
will be performed in a Payload Processing Facility (PPF) to be designated for
SCE use. PPF tasks include receiving and inspection, refurbishment, prepara-
tion, and checkout operations as necessary ' r c , establish SCE system flight
readiness.
The SCE will then be transferred to either a Vertical or Horizontal Processing
Facility where it will be integrated with other assigned coflight manifested
payloads (into a complete cargo assembly) and processed for launch using
conventional Shuttle Orbiter preflight procedures. Either the vertical or the
horizontal processing mode may be used for the SCE, permitting flexibility in
its selection for compatibility with other payloads. Although basically the same
operations are performed in either mode, each is discussed separately because
different facilities/procedures are used in each.
ry
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5.9.1.1 Payload Processing Facility (PPF) Operations. A sequence diagram of
the operations to be performed in the PPF are presented in Figure 5-8. These
activities, encompassing approximately six weeks of SCE preparation and check-
out tasks, are deburibed below.
a. Following flight certification testing at JSC, the SCE will be shipped to KSC.
b. Upon arrival at the designated KSC PPF, the SCE equipment will be
unpackaged. An initial inspection will then be performed.
c. Other items to be received and inspected in the PPF will include the flight
instrumentation components ( strain gages, thermocouples, accelerometers,
and load cells) and associated cabling, and a simple ground test switch panel.
d. The truss assembly will be deployed horizontally while installed in its
handling and transportation dolly. The ground test switch panel and a
power supply (simulating the Orbiter 28 vdc power) will be connected to the
SCE and a preliminary electrical check performed. In preparation for truss
extension, the truss sidemembers will be manually unlatched and positioned.
265687-6
Figure 5-8. SCE Payload Processing Facility Operations
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e. The truss will then be fully extended (in increments of several bay groups
at a time) as commanded from the switch panel operating the SCE control
	 j
unit (CU) . As the truss is extended, GSE support dollies will be manually
positioned under the structure to provide physical support in the extended
configuration and to allow the necessary movement of the truss across the
floor.	 +
f. In the fully extended position, a complete inspection of the mast structure
will be accomplished and any discrepant areas refurbished.
g. Flight instrumentation, electrical equipment, and harnessing will then be
installed on the SCE and applicable functional checks and calibrations per-
formed. The suitcase experiment(s) will also be checked out and installation
capabilities verified. Other checks will include an end-to-end test of the
tip mass jettisoning system.
h. The mast will then be retracted (using the ground test switch panel and SCE
CU for control) , and an inspection performed in the retracted configuration.
This will be followed by a final extend/retract cycle to verify that the added
instrumentation components and harnessing do not adversely do not adversely
affect the deployment and retraction processes. During this final cycle,
prime r to retract, a complete cleaning of the mast structure will be performed.
i. The truss will be fully retracted and folded to its stowed configuration. The
truss will be electrically disconnected and lifted by handling sling from its
dolly. The truss will be installed vertically on the FSE support structure
which will be mounted on its handling and transportation trailer.
j. After installation of the pitch braces, all power, data and control harness
connectors will b p
 mated and all circuits functionally checked. The truss
will be rotated from the vertical to hori%ontal position to vertical position
several times to verify no interference with harnesses exists and to test the
pitch strut and holddown latches. The spring mount latches will be cycled
to verify their function.
k. All suitcase experiment hardware will be secured in the stowed positions on
the support structure and the truss rotated to the stowed position and
latched. The SCE will then be prepared for transportation to either the
Vertical Processing Facility (VPF) or the Operations and Checkout Facility
(O&C) which would be the Horizontal Processing Facility (HPF). The
subsequent preflight operations are summarized in Figure 5-9 and described
in the following subsections.
5.9.1.2 SCE Vertical Processing Operations. In the vertical processing mode,
preflight operations will be performed at three separate facilities: the PPF
(previously discussed above) , the VPF, and the launch pad. The general flow
sequence of operations to be performed in each of these facilities for vertical
5-15
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processing of the SCE is depicted in Figure 5-10. Timespan requirements for the
major activities involved are shown in Figure 5-11. Further description of the
VPF and launch pad operations is provided below.
Upon arrival at the VPF, the SCE will be removed from its handling pallet and
placed in the Vertical Payload Handling Device (VPHD) where it will be physically
integrated with its other coflight manifested payloads. The SCE (and the
coflight payloads) will then be connected to the Cargo Integration Test Equip-
ment (CITE) which electrically simulates the flight Orbiter. The Orbiter standard
switch panel (or its equivalent) to be used for SCE control is provided in the
simulated Aft Flight Deck, and all interface cabling will be installed within the
test stand as appropriate.
Following preliminary interface tests, approximately three and one-half weeks of
integrated CITE testing with the manifested payloads will be performed. The
SCE portion of these CITE tests will consist primarily of functional and mission
simulation tests.
After completion of CITE testing, the SCE and manifested payloads will be placed
	 f
into the Multiuse Mission Support Equipment (MMSE) canister and transferred to
the launch pad aboard the MMSE transporter.
i
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At the launch pad, the payloads will first be placed in the Rotating Service
Structure (RSS) which in turn will be used to install the payload into the
Orbiter bay. After physical installation is complete, all SCE/Orbiter interface
harnesses will be connected.
A series of brief interface checks will then be performed to verify all SCE power,
control, and data circuits. From this point on through launch and up until SCE
mission deployment, the SCE is essentially dormant except for final pyrotechnic
bolt installation and connections.
After completion of approximately one additional week of Orbiter checkout
operations, the Orbiter and its payload are ready for launch.
5.9.1.3 SCE Horizongal Processing Operations. In the horizontal processing
mode, the SCE will be cycled through five separate facilities during preflight
operations: the PPP (discussed previously) , the O&C (which acts as the
horizontal processing facility), the OPF, the VAB, and the launch pad. The
general flow sequence of operations through these five facilities is illustrated
in Figure 5-12. Timesp_ an req uirements for the major activities involved nre
shown in Figure 5-13. Description of the O&C, OPF, VAB and launch pad opera-
tions are provided below.
Following checkout in the PPF, the SCE will be transferred to the 0&C facility
for horizontal processing. The operations to be performed in the O&C are
virtually the same as those performed in the VPF except they are conducted with
the SCE (and other coflight payloads) oriented in a horizontal rather than
vertical attitude.
Upon arrival in the 0&C, the SCE will be placed in a horizontal test stand and
integrated with its other coflight payloads. The Cargo Integration Test Equip-
ment (CITE) will then be connected to the SCE, followed by integrated CITE
testing with the other manifested payloads. The SCE portion of these CITE
tests will consist o't functional and mission simulation tests.
After completion of CITE testing, the SCE and manifested payloads will be placed
into the MMSE canister and transferred to the OPF.
At the OPF, the SCE and coflight payloads will be installed in the Orbiter
cargo bay. After physical installation is complete, all SCE/Orbiter interface
harnesses will be connected.
A series of brief interface checks will then performed to verify all SCE power,
control, and data circuits. From this point on through launch and up until
SCE mission deployment, the SCE is essentially dormant. No further access to
the SCE is required.
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Following these interface checks, the Orbiter cargo bay doors are closed and the
Orbiter will be towed to the VAB .
In the VAB , the Orbiter will be erected to a vertical attitude and mated to the
external tank and solid rocket boosters (SRB's) on the Mobile haunch Platform
(MLP) . These operations involve approximately one week of space shuttle
activities only; no SCE operations are required.
After completion of the VAB operations, the entire vehicle assembly (with the
SCE installed in the Orbiter cargo bay) will be transported to the launch pad
and prepared for launch. These operations require approximately three weeks
of space shuttle activities. Final SCE operations require installation of pyro-
technic bolts in the tip mass ejection mechanism.
5.9.2 POSTFLIGHT GROUND OPERATIONS AT KSC. Following completion of the
SCE flight mission, the SCE will be returned to KSC by the Orbiter. The post-
flight operations required by the SCE at KSC are described below. A block
diagram of these operations is shown in Figure 5-14.
After the mission is completed and the Orbiter has landed, it will enter the OPF.
The flight data recorder tapes will be removed from the Orbiter. The aCE will
be lifted out of the Orbiter bay using the MMSE strongback and placed on the
shipping/handling trailer. The SCE will be transported to the PPF.
Remove	 RetrieveFlight	 Transport	 InspectI	 SCE	 Data	 SCE	 SCE& Harnesses
	 From	 To PPF	 & Reportfrom Orbiter	 Orbiter ItL ....._........._.	 OPF ............,.........J	 L......, .....PPF ..._. _.. J
Figure 5-14. SCE Postflight Ground Operations Sequence
17121701 92
The truss assembly will be removed from the ASE support structure and installed
on its handling and transportation dolly. The truss will be electrically connected
to the support structure subsystems. The ground test switch panel and power
supply will be connected to the CU and the truss will be fully deployed on its
support dollies.
The structures and components will be inspected for evidence of damage and
degradation. All discrepancies will be documented.
Following the inspections the truss will be repackaged and prepared for final
disposition.
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5.0.3 GROUND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (GSE) REQUIREMENTS. GSE items
required to support SCE preflight and postflight ground, operations are listed
In Table 5-3.
Table 5-3. GSE Items for the SCE
Item Quantity Purpose
Ground Test Switch Panel 1 Checkout, deployment & retrac-
tion control
Truss Handling & Transpor- 1 Ground handling and transport
tation Dolly of truss assembly
Payload Handling & Trans- 1 Ground handling & transport of
portation Trailer ASE
Truss Support Dollies 20 Support truss during ground
deployment
..-_-._-^ *^__^,:_^ e„s_P ayload Harld lln 	 Soling' 1 U4nL-„r, AQV aiinnnrt atriint»rn. &_A+	 ...t.	 ^^rrp--
or fully assembled payload
Truss Handling Sling 1 Pick-up trus q assembly
Cable Kit 1 Interconnect power, data and
control functions for ground
test and checkout.
5.10 FLIGHT OPERATIONS PLAN
The flight test sequence will require two days of the total mission. The first
few days in orbit will be used to deploy the sate;litr payloads. Following these
operations the SCE activities will be initiated.
The flight test operations sequence and timelines for the first day of the
experiment are shown in Figure 5-15.	 The first day's activities include the
series of controls and dynamics tests described in Figure 5-16.
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Figure 5-15. Flight Test Operations Sequence and Timelines for Day 1
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The day one experiments will be conducted by the payload specialist and the
pilot and/or mission specialist working at the aft flight deck control and display
panels. The payload specialist will control and monitor the experiment while
the pilot performs RMS operations and controls the roll and pitch maneuvers.
The dynamics and controls flight test sequences are outlined in figure 5-16.
Test sequence 1 of the 1/3 do!' ►loyed structure performs modal surveys in pitch
and roll with intermediate and final damping operations to stabilize the struc-
ture prior to the start of each test. The 1/3 deployed configuration corresponds
to the configuration tested as part of the ground test program so that compara-
tive data are obtained.
Test sequence 2 is the first test of the effects of the structural inertia and low
frequency on the Orbiter and DAP, This series of tests would be performed
using appropriate combin&tions oe rate limit and pointing limit. This sequence
and the first part of test sequence 2 will allow the limits of DAP control to be
approached using decreasing steps of low frequency with increased steps in
moments of inertia.
Test sequence 3 includes extended random excitation in order to provide data
on a wide range of modes. Excitation and measurement of torsional modes are
also included,
Test sequence 4 uses the RCS to excite the first mode in pitch with subsequent
measurement of first mode decay in free drift. This test is run with and without
joints unloaded to establish damping characteristics and the effects of joint
clearance on damping. Test sequence number 4 could be performed early oil
the second day of the experiment prior to the EVA egress. This would provide
more contingency time for the day 1 activities.
The construction operations test sequence will be conducted on the second day
of the experiment. This test . ­ .4uence, illustrated in Figure 5-17, includes
several assembly and install; #l ,
 n tasks that require manual and EVA-assisted
operations. The EVA tasks will be performed by the mission specialist and
the commander. The payload specialist will continue to control and monitor the
SCE from the aft flight deck control and display panel, while the pilot performs
the RMS operations. The EVA will remain in effect until all equipment is fully
stowed for reentry and landing.
5.11 INSTRUMENTATION PLAN
Instrumentation requirements for the SCE are summarized in Table 5-4.
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No. Measurement Type Sensor ally Location
1 Tip motion rate Rate gyro 8 1 each damper set
2 Mode shape & Servo-accelerometer 18 3 each at 8 truss stations
frequency Rate gyro 3 1 each at 3 truss stations
P/E accelerometer 12 3 each at 4 truss stations
3 Z-axis acceleration P/E accelerometer 1 Tip of truss
4 Tip deflection Laser & detector array 1 Tip & base of truss
5 Carriage position Rotary encoder 2 1 each deploy carriage
6 Motor temperatures Thermocouple 10 2 each carriage
1 each damper set
7 Truss member load Strain gauge 48 2 each longitudinal
& diagonal, truss bay 33
& 50
8 Roll support loads Strain gauge 4 1 each deployment rail
Roll support lug
8 Pitch support loads Load cell 2 1 each pitch brace	 7G
10 Trunion pin loads Strain gauge 10 2 each pin	 4-
11 Trunlon pin motions Potentiometer 5 1 each pin	 s
_	 o
2	 1/6
4	 --2
3
t 4
i
i
J
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Figure 5-17. Construction Operations Test Sequence and Timelines for Day 2
Table 5-4. SCE Instrumentation Requirements
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5.12 OPTIONaL FLIGHT EXPERIMENT
5.12.1 RCS PLUME EFFECTS EXPERIMENT. It was suggested by the NASA that the
deployable truss could possibly be used to support sensors to measure RCS plume
effects at several distances from the Orbiter. The concept shown in Figure 5-18
would place sensors at the points where the plume core from fore and aft
thrusters intersect the truss. A third sensor at 90 meters from the Orbiter
would see either or both plumes.
The plume c1heAracteristics of interest for these types of experiments are the
plume pressure, condensible volatiles , particulates, and high velocity ice
crystals. The concers are the potential damage and contamination of highly
sensitive spacecraft instruments and arrays by the Orbiter RCS plumes.
The candidate sensors to consider for performing plume effects measurements
are described in Table 5-5.
Sensor locations
• A — Forward plume core Intersects at m, 20 rr
• 13—  Aft plume core Intersects at m, 38 meters
• C — 1 /R 2
 both plumes confirmed at > 90 me
RCS plume characteristics
• 38 RCSs 875 lb
• 2,140 gms/sec/per RGS
• 17'/2 deg '/a angle core
• Constituents
H2O	 32%
Lightweights — H, N, CCT
	
> 60%
Nitrates
	
= 2-3%
• Velocity =^- 3,000 m/sec
• Ice crystal size ^ 400-1,000 microns
Figure 5-18. RCS Plume Effects Experiment Concept
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Table 5-5. Plume Effects Sensors to Consider
IBaratron
• Measures plume presjure
• Now a pant of IECM
• Thin film could be damaged by liftoff or particulate
TQCM
• Thermoelectric quartz crystal microbalance
• Measure condensable volatiles
• Now a part of IECM
• Minimum temp of —60°C will not condense H2O
• Relatively high power
• Away from RCS nitrates are probably atomized & collectible
• Could be used for non H2 coilel-.tion (i.e., the bad stuff)
Mass spectrometer
• Measures & classifies the complete plume
• University of Michigan version on IECM
• FxnAnSive
• Could be used for 1/R 2 validation
Heat flux calorimeter
• Measures degradation of a/E due to contamination
• Solar flux heats black surface & surfaces of materials of Interest
• Relative surface temperature measurement	 0
• JPL design used on NOAA & NOVA
TEOM
• Tapered element oscillating microbalance
• Particulate trapper
Impingement sensor
• Acoustical sensor
• Like micrometeorite detector
• Measure accelerated ice particles
• Classify by momentum
Surface damage
• Passive array — "Measure Impact of Impact"
• Solar cell cover glass
• Silver coated tei llon thermal surfaces
• Thin foils
• Bring back for damage study
• Various distances in plume core to determine
minimum operating range of RCSs In docking maneuver
02032178.28
02032 178.20
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Examples of the available options that might be performed in conjunction with
the SCI; are given below with their approximate costs. A more detailed study
Is required to establish installation techniques for these sensors and to deter-
mine the length of time and RCS activity required to conduct such an experiment.
a. Option 1
For G $200K + integration cost
• Passive surface damage
•	 Heat flux calorimeter
• TQCM
b. Option 2
For approximately $1M + integration cost
• Impact sensor + passive array surface damage
• Combined heat flux calorimete-r and TQCM
• Plume pressure experiment
& 1
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SECTION 6
PRELIMINARY PROGRAM PLAN
6.1 COST ANALYSIS
Preliminary ROM cost estimates have been prepared for the candidate Space
Construction Experiment (SCE) concept described in this report. Two annual
funding requirements have also been developed in accordance with the nominal
and alternate program schedule options discussed in Section 6.2.
6.1.1 METHODOLOGY. The parametric cost model used for this analysis is
an adaptation of our Space System Life Cycle Cost (SSLCC) model tailored
specifically for the SCE. The SSLCC model was developed in-house over the
last several years and used extensively for the SCAFEDS, Geostationary Plat-
form Study, OTV study, and other studies of similar flight vehicles.
Initially a cost-related work breakdown structure (WBS) was developed that
included all elements incurred by the SCE project for each program phase:
development, production, and operations. Operations costs are not addressed
in this study. This cost WBS then sets the format for the estimating model,
the individual cost estimating relationships (CERs), cost factors, or specific
point estimate requirements, %id the cost estimate output. Estimates are
then made for each cost element either at the breakdown level shown or, in
certain cases, one level lower. These estimates are then accumulated to pro-
vide the cost for each program phase.
The estimating methodology varies with the cost element and with the availability
of historical data or supplier estimates. Where sufficient detailed definition
of the hardware and tasks are available, detailed estimates of labor and material
may be developed. This procedure was used to develop the cost of the deploy-
able truss beam. Drawings, parts lists, and fabrication description were used
to generate material procurement requirements and labor hours for design and
analysis, tooling design and fabrication, test article manufacturing, development
test, GSE design and fabrication, sustaining engineering and tooling, acceptance
test, and quality assurance. These labor and material requirements are then
translated into dollar projections.
For other new hardware, parametric CERs are used. These CERs have been
derived for various families of hardware and many subcategories, representing
differing levels of complexity. They are derived from available historical cost
data or detailed estimating information and relate cost to a specific driving param-
eter such as weight, area, power output, etc. For example, the various experi-
ment structural items (other than the truss beam) were estimated using CERs.
s	 1
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Engineering point estimates were used for specific pieces of known equipment
where the definition data were sufficiently detailed or the hardware item was
existing equipment and cost data were available; for example, ROM estimates
for some of the dynamic test equipment (gyros, etc.).
The remaining wraparound cost elements, such as system engineering and
Integration, program management, etc., are estimated using cost factors con-
sisting of appropriate percentages of the applicable related program effort.
The nonrecurring or development phase includes ail one-time tasks and hard-
ware required to design and test the equioment . It includes the design and
anelysis of all ground and flight hardware including structural analysis, stress,
dynamics, thermal, mass properties, etc. Tho nonrecurring category also
includes all component development and test t„arough component qualification
as well as all component development test hardware. In addition, this phase
includes: software development; system engineering and integration; system
level test hardware and the engineering test prototype and qualification article;
and system test. Since the prototype approach will be used for this experiment,
a single flight article will be manufactured and all system level testing will be
accomplished using the flight vehicle, which will then be refurbished and
a..a_ a a,. lhS..La	 c3.......,+5....	 Atni+ Sv...1..ri.+fi 4— th4n	 nn n ^ 1"IeV rino4rr"Up LLCLted to flight Bollalg Ur at- ion	 CllOV Itlt:l tiucMt 111 4 lra p1,llacac "&W %ANA" _'W'^45.a,
development, test, and manufacture; facilities; and overall program management
and administration.
The production phase (unit cost estimate) includes all tasks and hardware
necessary to fabricate one complete set of flight hardware equipment. It 	 c
includes all material and component procurement, parts fabrication, sub-
assembly, and final assembly. In addition, this category includes the required
quality control/inspection task, an acceptance test procedure for sell-off to the
customer, and program management and administration activities accomplished
during the manufacturing phase.
Operating costs, NASA ground testing, and Shuttle-user charges were not
included in the cost analysis at this time.
6.1.2 GROUND RULES AND ASSUMPTIONS. The general ground rules and
assumptions governing the subsequent cost estimates are:
a. Costs are estimated in constant 1982 dollars.
b . Prime contractor fee is not included.
c . Costs are for the design, development, and fabrication of a single,
flyable experiment.
d. All system testing required is accomplished using the flight article
hardware which is then refurbished for flight. 	 !i
e. System testing conducted by NASA is excluded.
6-2
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f. No mission operations or Shuttle-user charges are presently included.
g. Tho cost estimates presented are rough-order-of-magnitude costs, for
planning purposes only.
6.1.3 WORI{ BREAKDO W N STR UCTURE ( WBS). The WBS is a comprehensive
breakdown of all program life cycle elements, categorized or sorted into several
levels of hardware and task or function-oriented end items, and serves to
identify the cost elements to be included in the cost analysis task. This WBS
contains all hardware and tasks associated with Phase C /D development and
test, fabrication of flight hardware, and the activities incurred during the test
flight. It serves as the basic format for cost reporting and programmatic data,
and to organize, plan, and manage the subsequent program. The WBS developed
for the SCE is shown graphizelly in Figure 6-1, and each element is briefly
defined below.
1.0
Space
Construction
Experiment
Program
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.8
Flight
I
Flight
I
I
Systems System
111,1
Spares Ground OperatJons
11.7
Program
Experiment Experiment Engineering & Test Support Management
Design & Fabrication Integration Equipment
Development
1.1.1 Truss
1.1.2 Dynamic
Test Equip.
1.1.3 RMS/EVA
Test Equip.
1.1.4 FSE
1.1.5 Software
1.2.1 Truss
1.2.2 Dynamic
Test Equip.
1.2.3 RMS/EVA
Test Equip.
1.2.4 FSE
1.2.5 IA & CO
Figure 6-1. ;pace Construction Experiment WBS
a. WBS 1.0 - Space Construction Experiment Program. This WBS element
summarizes all effort and material required for the design, development,
fabrication, assembly, test and checkout, and operation of the SCE.
b. WBS 1.1 - Flight Experiment Design and Development. The design and
development activities include all tasks and hardware for design and
development and testing of the SCE. It includes the required design and
analysis for all ground and flight hardware, including structural analysis,
stress, dynamics, thermal, mass properties, etc. This nonrecurring
category includes tooling, component development, and test through com-
ponent qualification, as well as all component development test hardware.
This element also includes software development.
6-3
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c. WBS 1...1 - Truss. The deployable truss is the primary structural element
being tested. It has a diamond cross section and 50 bays and is constructed
of composite materials. Also included arc the deployment mechanism, experi-
ment support elements, and the tip mass.
d . WBS 1.1.2 - Dynamic Test Equipment. The equipment includes torque wheels
and torque motor controllers, gyros, accelerometers, loads, displacement and
temperature instrumentation, and their wiring harness. This equipment
excites and measures vibratinal modes and system parameters and provides
active damping augmentatio„ .
e. WBS 1.1.3 - RMS /EVA Test Equipment. The RMS /EVA test equipment
Includes dummy "black boxes" and attachment fittings, a dummy cabling
harness and attach fittings, a portable EVA workstand, and special RMS
end pieces.
f. WBS 1.1.4 - Flight Support Equipment (FSE). The FSE consists of the
equipment supporting structure, a data acquisition system and a control
unit, and their wiring harnesses.
g. WBS 1.1.5 - Software. This WBS element consists of all labor, material,
and computer resources necessary to provide validated SCE flight software.
It includes the design, programming, validation, and verification.
h. WBS 1.2 - Flight Experiment Fabrication. The flight experiment fabrication
cost element includes all tasks and hardware necessary to provide one eocn-
plete set of flight hardware equipment. It includes all material and component
procurement, parts fabrication, subassembly, and final assembly. In addi-
tion, this category includes the required quality control/inspection task, an
acceptance test procedure for sell-off to the customer, and program manage-
ment and administration activities accomplished during the manufacturing
phase.
I. WBS 1.2.1 thru 1VB. S 1.2.4 - Subs s^ tems. See above.
j. WBS 1.2.5 - Integration Assembly and Checkout. This WBS element consists
of all effort and materials required to accomplish subsystem installation,
final assembly, checkout, and acceptance testing of all mission payloads
carried on the platform. These are all ground activities and culminate in
sell-off to the NASA (DD Form 250) .
k. WBS 1.3 - Systems Engineering and Integration. This WBS element sum-
marizes all system level studies, analyses, and tradeoffs to support the
development of requirements, specification, and interfaces necessary to
direct and control the design of the overall system. It also includes all
mission studies and analyses to establish requirements and planning for all
phases of the mission and logistics activities. It also includes all product
assurance activities consisting of safety, reliability, maintainability quality
assurance, and parts, material, processes (PMP) control.
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1. WBS 1.9 - System Test. This WBS element summarizes all effort and hard-
ware required to conduct and support all major system level testing con-
ducted by the contractor necessary to refine and validate the design and
verify the accomplishment of the development roquireme7 ts. They may include
but not be limited to full-scale structural tests, Integrated avionics tests,
all-up functional tests, and payload functional and integration testing.
This element includes test article refurbishment and reconfiguration; test
planning, test analysis, preparation, and test operations; as well as toast
software and test support activities performed prior to delivery to the
NASA.
m. WBS 1.5 - Spares. Ths WBS element includes the procurement and/or
fabrication of all spare and repair parts necessary for the develoment and
operational period.
n. WBS 1.6 - Ground Support Equipment (GSE). This WBS element summarizes
all effort and material required to define, design, develop, test and qualify,
procure, fabricate, assemble, and checkout all GSL' required to support
the SCE during the development, manufacturing, and operations phase. It
includes all necessary handling and transportation equipment, and functional
checkout equipment.
o. WBS 1.7 - Operations. This WBS element summarizes all of the effort and
materials required to support the SCE project during its operational phase.
It includes all ground operation and STS integration activities, flight and
mission operations, and operations support.
p. WBS 1.8 - Program Management. This WBS element summarizes all of the
effort required to manage, direct, and control the entire SCE program.
These functional tasks and activities include planning, organizing, budgeting,
scheduling, directing, and controlling other administrative tasks to ensure
the overall objectives of the program are accomplished.
6.1.9 FLIGHT EXPERIMENT COST ESTIMATES. Following the selection of the
preferred concept from the candidatF-i examined in the first phase of the study,
additional analysis provided increaseu design definition detail and refined input
parameters used in the cost analysis. Using the updated information concerning
the current SCE configuration generated in this phase of study, new cost
estimates were made for the selected SCE as defined. The results of this
analysis are presented in Table 6-1. The total cost for the design, develop-
ment, fabrication, and test of the SCE is approximately $12M. The experiment
flight hardware fabrication accounts for about $5.3M and the remaining $6.9M
is required for design and analysis, component development and test, system
engineering, the system level test, program, and program management. It
should be noted that all system level testing and integration is conducted using
the flight experiment equipment that is subsequently refurbished for flight con-
figuration. Also included in this design and development cost is software at
$0.2M, GSE at $0.16M, and spare and repair parts at $0.27M.
6-5
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Table 6-1. Preliminary ROM Coat Estimates
COST (1082 M$)
Design &
Item Development Fabrication
Flight Hardware
Structure 1.00 2.86
Dynamic Test Equipment 0.03 1.01
RMS /EVA Test Equipment 0.19 0.20
Flight Support Equipment 1.30 0.60
Assembly, Integration, and C/O -- 0.27
Software 0.20 —
System Engineering & Integration 0.77 —
System Test 0.78 0.13
GSE 0.16 —
Spares 0.27 —
Facilities 0
Program Management 0.39 0.25
TOTAL 6.85 .5.32
GRAND TOTAL
_	
12.17
The majority of the hardware design and development cost is required for
structure and mechanisms including the truss, its deployment mechanism, and
the supporting structure (FSE) for mounting the SCE in the Shuttle payload
bay. The dynamic test equipment is considered as virtually all off-the-shelf
equipment such as gyros and accelerometers and very little in the way of com-
ponent development will be required. Only a nominal cost allowance is required
for the RMS /EVA test equipmetn in that there are mass and form mockups only
to establish the feasibility of attaching equipment to the truss beam.
Operations costs were not estimated at this time but would consist of trans-
portation (to KhSC), and ground operations for preparation for STS installation
and postflight disposition plus support activities during the flight.
6.1.5 ANNUAL FUNDING REQUIREMENTS. Annual funding requirements by
fiscal year for development and flight article fabrication were generated by
spreading individual cost elements in accordance with the subsequent program
schedules discussed below. These annual funding requirements for the SCE
are presented in Figure 6-2 and highlight the funding differences between the
two schedule options.
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Figure 6-2. SCE Annual Funding Requirements
6.2 PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT PLAN
Based on the overall program scope of this S CE and the desired milestones, two
summary program development schedules have been established. The first
schedule (Figure 6-3) represents a nominal development approach keyed to a
flight in late CY86. The second schedule (Figure 6-4) is designed for a slower
startup and a flight one y ,)ar later in CY87.
The approach used to develop these master schedules was to first establish the
overall program milestones: All major functional task areas were then identified,
together with the necessary sequence of major activities and events. These were
to include the sequence of functions and tasks required for each of the principal
phases: experiment development and test, flight article fabrication, and the
operational flight. Once these major milestones and tasks were identified,
detailed program milestones, task durations, and other pertinent data were laid
out in the master program schedule. They key actiN i.les of each functional task
area discipline are identified and time-phased relationships to each other and to
the external program milestones were identified. This program master schedule
serves as a focal point for displaying and evaluating intrrrfaee constraints and
time-critical elements.
In Option. 1 the overall design and development schedule for this experiment
provides for a 42-month development program leading to the flight test in
November 1986. The development period is preceded by a Phase A; B definition
phase in 1981 and 1982.
The planned SCE development is initiated in mid-CY83. Initial design and
analysis and development milestones include a Preliminary Requirement Review
(PRR) at eight weeks and a Preliminary Design Review (PDR) at six months.
The Critical Design i,eview (CDR) follows PDR by five months. The first
6-7
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tooling is available for the parts fabrication in twelve months, and the overall
experiment fabrication is completed at 23 months. Contractor development and
system testing using the flight experiment hardware is completed in about 25
months, about mid-CY85. System testing of the SCE is preceded by the normal
component and assembly testing in support of the development effort as well as
the required qualification certifications. The SCE is then delivered to LaRC
and JSC for additional system level testing.
Following NASA testing, the SCE is transported to John F. Kennedy Space
Center (KSC) for a two-month period for integration processing and installation
into the Space Transportation System (STS). This period may be shorter and
some of the preparation may be conducted at JSC because of NASA desire to
minimize STS cargo on-site residency time at KSC . This period is followed by
the operational launch, deployment, and test. After return to earth, a nominal
postflight time allowance is scheduled to handle disposition of flight experiment
and GSE, and to analyze and evaluate the flight test data.
In Option 2, the development period has been extended to 48 months and delayed
to lessen the annual funding requirements and minimize the FY83 requirements
but still provide for a flight in CY87. In this option, the program go-ahead is
delayed to the last quarter of F Y $3 and the bulk of the contractor design and
development testing, and fabrication and assembly is conducted in FY84 and
FY85, respectively. Major testing is accomplished in FY86 and FY87, and the
flight is scheduled in the last quarter of FY87.
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SECTION 7
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This section presents the major conclusions from the SCEDS Part II study effort
and provides recommendations for subsequent program efforts.
7.1 CONCLUSIONS
7.1.1 PRELIMINARY DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
a. The basic requirements for a representative large space antenna feed mast
can be satisfied with the tetrahedral deployable diamond truss as recon-
figured in Part II of the study.
b. Tne modal excitation approach of using torque wheels at the tip of the test
structure offers an excellent solution for exciting the lower modes.
c. Structural dynamic modeling accuracies are enhanced through component,
subassembly, and partially deployed ground testing.
d. A flexible base mount for the test structure allows the modal characteristics
to be varied so that Orbiter DAP control capabilities can be challenged by
approaching its control limits by degrees.
e. Mission assignment is required to confirm the basic experiment envelope
and Orbiter interfaces.
7.1.2 FLIGHT CONTROL ANALYSIS. Reduced modal frequencies of the test
structure have been shown to provido a control challenge to the DAP.
7.1.3 PROGRAMMATI CS
a. A 1986 flight is achievable is program start is initiated in early 1983.
b. Total SCE program costs have escalated to over $10M as a result of the
changes in requirements and greater detail of definition accomplished in
Part II.
7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
7.2.1 SYSTEMS DESIGN AND ANALYSIS
a. Process request for preliminary mission assignment based on Part II results.
b. Evaluate Part II preliminary design for cost reduction approaches.
,D
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c. Further refine SCR preliminary design to incorporate cost reduction
changes and mission assignment constraints.
d. Perform preliminary design of RVA/RMS experiments.
e. Perform preliminary design of potential add-on experiments such as plume
effects measurements.
7.2.2 FLIGHT CONTROL ANALYSIS
a. Review CSDL DAP-structure interactions analysis data and refine modal
excitation and DAP interactions amplitudes and loads.
b. Perform dynamic analysis of partially deployed case.
7-2
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APPENDIX A
SPACE CONSTRUCTION EXPERIMENT
PRELIMINARY SAFETY ANALYSIS
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	 A-2	 *Reference 'Caution and Warning" in JSC 11123.	
NASA-JSC
c0
HAZARD LIST
PAY40A0 SUOSYSTQM DATE
SCE Electrical 2-3-82
APPLICABLE	 SAFETY
HAZARD	 GROUP HAZARD	 TITLE REGUIREMEHfi
Electrical Shock Personnel contact with electri- 201.2, 202.2, 215,
city 217
Explosion Rupturing of electronic 201.2, 202.2, 208.7
packages
Fire Ignition of electronic packages 201.2, 202.2, 206,
and/or surrounding materials 213
Temperature Hot surface induced by excessive 201.2, 202.2, 206,
Extremes current flow 213
NOTE:	 Unless indicated other-
wise,	 the paragraph numbers
for the requirements are taken
from NHB 1700.7A "Safety Policy
and Requirements for Payloads
using the Space Transportation
System	 (STS)."
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APPLICABLE
	 SAFETY
HAZARD	 GROUP HAZARD	 TITLE REGUIREMEHT
Contamination Offgassing of hazardous 201.2,	 209.4
materials
Fire: flammable materials support 201.2,	 202.2,	 206,
combustion 209.3
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HAZARD LIST
PAYLOAD STEM
DATE
SCE Mechanical 12-2-82
APPLICABLE	 SAFETY
HAZARD
	
GROUP HAZARD	 TITLE REQUIREMENT	 -
Collision Premature beam extension 201.2,	 202.2c2,
206,	 207
Premature jettison 201.2,	 202.2c2,
205,	 206,	 207
Premature release of rail 201.2,	 202.2c2,
latches 206,	 207
Premature release of tip mass 201.2,	 202.2c2,
206,	 207
Orbiter cargo bay doors close 201.2,	 202.2
prematurely	
IRMS collides with STS 201.2,	 202.2
Injury and Illness Inadvertent retraction during 2"01.2,	 202.2,	 217
EVA
RNIS injures personnel during EVA 201.2,	 202.2,	 217
Damage to space suit during EVA 201,2,	 202.2,	 217
Loss o f Entry Payload blocks closure of cargo 201.2,	 202.2d,	 205
Capability bay doors
Explosion Inadvertent	 initiation of pyro- 210
technic separation bolt
^
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PAYLOAD
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Structures
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APPLICABLE	 SAFETY
HAZARD	 GROUP HAZARD	 TITLE REQUIREME NT
Collision failure of beam structure 201.2,	 2v2.2,	 208.1,
208.2,	 208.3
Failure of support structure 201.2,	 202.2,	 208.1,
208.2,	 208,3
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Ground Support Equipment
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APPLICABLE	 SAFETY
HAZARD QRDUP HAZARD
	
TITLE uREQUIREMEN
GolliGicn Cosa of control during; ground 291.2,	 293.2,	 313,
dandling 213
Structural failure of CS; 291.3,	 292.2,	 298.1,
298.3
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JSC Farm 542A (Feb 78)	 NASA-JSC
OF POM	 kXT
e
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No.
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT
a
=1
PAYLOAD PHASL
CE 0
4
oboSYSTEM A
Electrical 2-3-82
HAZARD TITLE
Electrical Shock Group:	 Electrical Shock
APPLICABLE	 SAFETY RECUIREMZNTSo
201.2 - Failure Tolerance, Catastrophic Hazards
	 215 - 11azardous3 Procedub,,-o
202.2 - Control of Hazardous Functions, Catastrophic
	 219 - Extravehicular Activity
JioCRIPTION Of HAZARDi
Personnel contacts exposed,
	
live, electrical conductor and ground.
HAZARD CAUSES
Wire harness damage exposes conductors,
HAZA11D
	 CONTROLf i
1.	 Only 28 VDC available, no health hazard.
2.	 Power not applied on ground except during test.
SAFETY	 VERIFICATION	 METHODSi
STAT7Si
Opun - pending detailed design and safety review
CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PHASE	 it
Payload Organization
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Pay load
Organization I STS Operator
. 1
JSC Form 542U (r80 'V)	 NASA-JSC
A-8
'^'i
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT
NO.
E-2
PAYLOAD PHASE
SCE 0
SuOSYSTEM
Electrical
OATH
2-82
HAZARD
	 TITLE
Rupturing of Electronic Packages 	 Group:	 Ex losion
APPLICABLE	 SAFETY	 REOUIREMENTSi
201.2 - Failure Tolerance, Castastrophic Hazards
202.2 - Control of Hazardous Funcrio-is, Catastrophic
208.7 - Structural,
	 Sealed Containers
DESCRIPTION	 OF	 HAZAROI
Explosion of electronic packages can damage other equipment or injury
personnel.
	 Damage could affect control of safety functions.
HAZARD
	 CAUSES1
Pressure buildup in packages if no venting system is provided.
I
I
HAZARD CONTROLSi
Electronic packages will be fully ventilated or sealed.
	 Sealed
packages will be proof tested to demonstrate pressure integrity.
SAFETY	 VERIFICATION	 METHODSt
,t^(''.	 ,M►
l`b^	 b`^1SV,1/i 'i	 ^+ lyl _'clo9 '7	 U
STA'JSi
	
..mss
Open - pending detailed design and safety review
CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PHASE	 II
Payload Organization
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS Operator j
NASA-JSCJSC Farm 5424 (reD 78)
A-9
NO.
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT E-3
PAYLOAD PHASE
SCE 0
SUBSYSTEM DATE
Electrical 2-82
HAZARD TITLE
Ignition of Electronic Packages Group:	 Fire
APPLICABLE	 SAFETY	 REQUIREMENTSS
-
201.2 - Failure Tolerance, Catastrophic Hazards 	 206 - Failure Propagation
202.2 - Control of Hazardous Functions, Catastrophic
	 213 - Electrical Systems
DESCRIPTION	 OF	 HAZARDS
Overheating of electrical component causes ignition of insulation
and/or surrounding materials.	 Electronic components ignite
flammable vapors.
HAZARD
	 CAUSESS
1.	 Excessive current in harness causes overheating.
2.	 Arci:g, sparking, or hot spots cause ignition of vapors.
HAZARD CONTROLSS
1.	 Provide current limiting to limit fault currents to safe values.
2.	 Perform explosuve atmosphere qualification tests of electronic
assemblies.
SAFETY
	
VERIFICATION	 METHOOSS
ORIGINAL PACE 6S
OF POOR QUALITY
STATUSi
Open - pending detailed design and safety review
CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PHASE	 II
Payload Organization
2
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS Operator
e
1SC Form 5421:1 ( 1" 913 111)	
A-10
	 NASA-JSC
^.
NO o
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT E-G
PAYLOAD PHASE
SCE 0
SUBSYSTEM DATE
Electrical
HAZARD TITLE
Hot Surface Induced by Excessive Current Flow 	 Group:	 Temperature Extremes
APPLICABLE	 SAFETY	 REOUIREMENTSi
201.2 - Failure Tolerance, Catastrophic Hazards	 206 - Failure Propagation
202.2 - Control of Hazardous Functions, Catastrophic
	 213 - Electrical Systems
DESCRIPTION	 OF	 HAZARDI
Excessive current flow throu gh wires, structural elements, or
tools creates a hot surface,
HAZARD	 CAUSESI
1.	 Short circuit in electronic package or E/M device,
2.	 Short circuit through structural member or tool.
HAZARD
	 CONTROLSi
1.	 Provide current limiting to limit fault currents to safe values.
2.	 Power not applied on ground except during test.
3.	 Power shall be inhibited during EVA contact with experiment.
SAFETY	 VERIFICATION	 METHOOSi
try
OF BOOR QUALON
STATUS]
Open - pending detailed design and safety review
CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PHASE	 II
Payload Organization
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization Ps,S operator
0
i
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NASA-!SCA-111SC Form 542 8 (Feb 18)I`
u
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PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT rl^l
PAYLOAD PHASE
SCE 0
SUBSYSTEM DATE
Materials 2-82
HAZARD TITLE
Offgassing of Hazardous Materials
	 Group; Contamination
APPLICABLE	 SAFETY REOUIREMEMTSi
201.2 - Failure Tolerance, Catastrophic Hazards
209.4 - Material Offgassing
DESCRIPTION	 OF	 HAZARDI
U'l ectionable odors or foul offgassing from materials used in equipment
on aft flight deck.
HAZARD	 CAUSESI
Improper material selection and control,
HAZARD CONTROLSi
There is no unique aft flight deck equipment necessary for the experiment
operations.
	 The standard Orbiter supplied switch panel will be used.
This equipment will be flight-proven prior to this mission,
SAFETY
	
VERIFICATION	 METHOOSi
zE?^ I- PAGE ISvlaC^da
4
POOR QUALITY
OF
,i
STATUSi
Open.	 Recommend hazard report closeout based on use of established
Orbiter equipment.
ii
CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PHASE	 II
Payload Organization
STS Operator
f
APPROVAL _ PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS Operator
1SC Form 5470 (,'ell rn)	
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is ij	 A-13
NO•
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT M°2
PAYLOAD PHASE
0SCE
SUBSYSTEM DATE
Materials 2-82
HAZARD TITLE
	
^^..
Flammable Materials Support Combustion Group:	 Fire
APPLICABLE	 SAFETY REOUIREMENTSi
201.2 - Failure Tolerance. Catastrophic Hazards	 206 - Failure Propagation
202.2 - Control of Hazardous Functions, Catastrophic	 209.3 - Flammable Material° ►
DESCRIPTION	 OF HAZARDI
Combustion in the Orbiter eargo bay is sustained by SCE materials.
HAZARD	 CAUSESI
Exposure of flammable materials to ignition sources.
HAZARD	 CONTROLS,
1.	 Eliminate/minimize ignition sources.
2.	 Use materials shown to be non -flammable or self-extinguishing
where practicable.
SAFETY
	
VERIFICATION	 NETHOOSi
^.'NA . PAG[: Is'
OF POOR QUALITY
3TATUSi
Open - pending detailed design and safety review
CONCURRE N CE PHASE I PHASE	 II
Payload Organization
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS Operator
a
NASA-JSC
	 j^
C+t*
NO.
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT Me-1
PAYLOAD PHASE
SCE 0
SUB sYSrEM
Mechanical
nATE
2-3-82
HAZARD TITLE
Premature Beam Extension
	 Group;	 Collision
APPLICABLE	 SAFETY	 REQUIREMENTSo
201.2 - Failure Tolerance, Catastrophic Hazards
	
206 - Failure Propagation
202.2c2 - Control of Deployment Function
	
207	 Redundancy Separation
DESCRIPTION	 OF	 HAZARDI
Inadvertent extension of truss assembly prior to truss package
rotation results in collision with Orbiter.
HAZARD CAUSES.
1.	 Inadvertent command co extension mechanism.
2.	 Failure of truss retaining latches.
HAZARD CONTROLSt
Deployment control must be 2 F/T to prevent inadvertent truss extension.
SAFETY	 VERIFICATION	 14ETHOOS.
ORIGINAL PAGE
POOR Q UA41^^OF
STATUS I
Open - pending detailed design and safety review
CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PI'ME	 II
Payload Organization
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS Operator
1SC Form 5424 (t8u Id) 	 NASA-JS'
A-14
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PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT Me-2
PAYLOAD PHASE
SCE 0
SUBSYSTEM DATE
Mechanical 2-3-52
HAZARD
	 TITLE
Premature Release of Jettison Latches Group;	 Collision
APPLICABLE
	
SAFETY
	
REQUIREMENTS,
201.1 - Failure Tolerance, Catastrophic Hazards 	 206 - Failure Propagation
202.2c2 - Control of Deployment Function
	 207 - Redundancy Separation
DESCRIPTION	 OF	 HAZARDS
Inadvertent release of Jettison latches prior to tip mass ejection
and RMS attachment results in collision between SCE and Orbiter.
HAZARD	 CAUSES,
Inadvertent release command to the Jettison latches.
HAZARD CONTROLS,
,Jettison latches are Shuttle-provided and will be flight-proven
prior to this mission.
SAFETY	 VERIFICATION	 METHODS,
ORIGINAL PAGE 19
OF POOR QUALITY
S T A -U S,
	
r	 —~ —^..-
Open.	 Recommend hazard report closeout based on use of established
Orbiter equipment.
CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PHASE	 II
Payload Organization
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS Operator
I
. ,
JSC Form 5420 (IaO 78)	 NASA-JSC
A-15
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NO.
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT Me-3
PAYLOAD PHASE
SCE 0
SUBSYSTEM DATE
Mechanical 2-3-82
HAZARD TITLE
Premature Release of Rail Latches Group:	 Collision
APPLICABLE	 SAFETY	 REOUIREMENTSo
201.2 - Failure Tolerance, Catastrophic Hazards
	
206 - Failure Propagation
202.2cl - Control of Deployment Function 	 207 - Redundancy Separation
DESCRIPTION	 OF	 HAZARD1
Inadvertent release of rail latches prior to cargo bay door
opening results in collision with Orbiter.
HAZARD CAUSESe
1.	 Structural failure of rail latch mechanisms.
2.	 Inadvertent command to open rail latches.
HAZARD CONTROLSt
1.	 Appropriate structural safety factors should be applied to
design of rail latch mechanism.
2.	 Mechanism control must be 2 F/T to prevent inadvertent rail
latch release.
SAFETY	 VERIFICATION	 METHOOSs
QRICINAL PAGE 65
OF POOR QUALITY
STATUSs
Open - pending detailed design and safety review
.t
CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PHASE	 Ii
i
Payload Organization
i
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS Operator
NASA-J'
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NO.
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT Me-4
PAYLOAD PHASE
SCR
SUBSYSTEM UA E
Mechanical 2-3-82
HAZARD
	 TITLE
Premature Release of Tip Mass	 Group;	 Collision
A ►► LICAOLE	 SAFETY	 REQUIREMENTS,
201.2 - Failure Tolerance, Catastrophic Hazards 	 206 - Failure Propagation
202.2c2 - Control of Deployment Function
	
207 - Redundancy Separation
DESCRIPTION	 OF	 HAZARD$
Inadvertent release of tip mass prior to truss package rotation
results in collision with Orbiter.
HAZARD
	 CAuSES,
1.	 Structural failure of tip mass anchoring mechanism.
2.	 Inadvertent command to release tip masses.
HAZARD	 CONTROLS,
1.	 Appropriate structural safety factors should be applied to
design of tip mass anchoring mechanism.
2.	 Mechanism control must be 2 F/T to prevent inadvertent
release of tip masses.
SAFETY
	 VERIFICATION	 METHODS,
0P	 .	 nn	 [?i41^n^n1l	 It\
OF	 QUALM
STATUS,
Open - pending detailed design and safety review
CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PHASE	 II
Payload Organization
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS Operator
NASA-JSC
c,I<
..
NO.
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT Me-5
PAYLOAD PHASE
SCE 0
SUBSYSTEM DATE
Mechanical
HAZARD
	 TITLE
Orbiter Cargo Bay Doors Close prematurely Croup:	 Collision
APPLICADLE	 SAFETY	 RiouiREMENTSI
201.2 - Failure Tolerance, Catastrophic hazards
202.2 - Control of hazardous Functions, Catastrophic
DESCRIPTION	 OF	 HRZARDI
Orbiter cargo bay doors inadvertently close while truss is deployed.
HAZARD
	 CAUSESt
Inadvertent command to close bay doors.
HAZARD
	
CONTROLSt
Cargo bay doors are Shuttle-provided and will be flight-proven prior
to this mission.
SAFETY
	
VERIFICATION	 HETHODSt
OF	
' y ,Pt
 QUALITY
STATUSi
Open.	 Recommend hazard report closeout based on use of established
Orbiter equipment.
CONCURRENCE PHASE
	
I PHASE	 It
Payload Organization
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE III
Payload
Organization STS (Operator
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PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT Ate-6
PAYLOAD PHASE
SCR Q
SUBSYCTE1:1
Mechanical
I)A TE
aP;400 TITLE
RMS Collides with Orbiter 	 Group:	 Collision
APPLICABLE	 SAFETY	 REOUIREMENTSt
201.2 - Failure 'tolerance, Catastrophic Hazards
202.2 - Control of Hazardous functions.	 Catastrophic
DESCRIPTION	 OF	 HAZARDi
RMS collides with Orbiter during experiment operations.
HAZARD CAUSM
1.	 Loss of control of RMS
2.	 Improper command to RA:S
3.	 Structural failure of RMS
4.	 Inadvertent RMS operations while doors are closed
HAZARD
	
CONTROLSi
RMS is Shuttle-provided and will be flight-proven prior to this mission.
SAFET(	 vERIFI CAT ION
	
METHOOSi
Cy.•	 Y^Y^i^3n	 !^6 iru^L
0r-	 QUALITY.
STATU 5
Open.	 Recommend hazard report closeout based on use of established
Orbiter equipment.
CONCURRENCE PHASE
	
I PHASE	 II	
^..
Payload Organization
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS Operator
a
NASA-AC1SC Form 542H (rea rB)
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nos
ND.
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT Me -7
PAYLOAD PHASE
SCE 0
^8U09YSTEM DATE
Mechanical 2-3-82
NASAPD TITLE
Inadvertent Trusa Retraction During EVA Group:	 Injury and Illneon
APPLICABLE	 SAFETY	 ACQUIRCMENTSi
201.2 - Failure Tolerance, Catastrophic Hazards
202.2 - Control of Hazardous Functions, Catastrophic
217	 - Extravehicular Activity
DESCRIPTION	 OF	 HAZAROi
Inadvertent retraction of bay while personnel is near causes injury,
t
mAZAAD MOM
Inadvertent retract command to deployment mechanism during EVA.
NA.ARD
	 C04TROL9i
Deployment control must be 2 F/T to prevent inadvertent retraction.
SAFETY	 VERIFICA'ION	 'JETN003i
^/^yypp 
0F,	
.	
V 9 L
U
STATL)Ss
Open - pending detailed design and safety review
CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PHASE	 II
Payload Organization
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS Operator
JSC form 5425 (FOO 75)
L`J	 A-2. .
NASA-J
NO.
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT Me°S
PAYLOAD P4AV9
SCE
M.......^+
SU®SYOTQM
A 9
Mechanical 2_82
HAZARD TITLQ
RMS Injuries Personnel During EVA Group!	 Injury and Illness
AP ► LICAiLIt
	
SAFETY RLOUIRCMENT91
201.2 - Failure Tolerance, Catastrophic 11azarda
202.2 - Control of hazardous Functions, Catastrophic
217	 - Extravehicular Activity
DESCRIPTION OF NAZAR01
RMS strikes or pushes peroonnel during EVA causing injury.
MAZARO CAUSM
1.	 Loss of control of RMS
2.	 Improper command to RMS
3.	 Structural Failure of RMS
NAZARO
	
CONTROLSI
RMS is Shuttle-provided and will be flight-proven prior to this mission.
SAFETY
	 VERIFICATION	 METNOOSi
STATUSI
Open.	 Recommend hazard report closeout based on use of established
Orbiter equipment.
CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PHASE	 II
Payload Organization
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS Operator
J5c Dorm a4Zn (raa i a )
A-21
	 NASA-JSC
e'u
NO.
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT MCV9
PAYLOAD PHASE
SCE 0
SU®SYSTEM
Mechanical
UA TK
2,-82
HAZARD TITLE
Damage to Space Suit During EVA Group:	 Injury and Illness
APPLICABLE
	
SAFETY	 REOUIREMENTSi
201.2 - Failure Tolerance, Catastrophic Nazardo
202.2 - Control of Hazardoua Functions, Catastrophic
219	
- Extravehicular Activity
DESCRIPTION	 OF HAZAROI
Damage occurring to apace suit during EVA causes loss of life support
and subsequent injury to personnel.
HAZARD	 CAUSESI
1.	 Sharp edges
2.	 Protrusions
3,	 ldnving parts
4.	 Insufficient illumination
NAZARO CONTROLSt
1.	 All surfaces and edges must be smooth, rounded, and free of burrs as
defined in Table 4-4 of JSC-10615, "Shuttle EVA Description and Design
Criteria':
2.	 Inadvertent motion of mechanical devices should be inhibited in a 2 F/T
manner.
(Continu ed on attached page)
SAFETY
	 VERI F ICATION	 NETHOOSi
ORIGINAL PAC,l 6
OF POOR QUALITY
STA'%Si
Open - pending detailed design and safety review
CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PHASE	 II
Payload Organization N
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS Operator
JSC FOrM 542 0 (rao 10)
	
NASA-JS
A-22
q A!1
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT
Paylaad -SCE Me-9
Subsystem - Mechanical
Hazard Title - Damage to Space Suit During EVA	 Group: Injury and Illness
HAZARD CONTROLS: (Continued)
3. Sufficient illumination must be provided for EVA work and
translation during the "dark" side of the earth orbit.
A-23 3
et!
N0.
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT Mer10
PAYLOAD PHASE
SCE 0
SV49Y5tEM
Mechanical
DAtE
2-3-82
HAZARD TITLE
Payload Blocks Cargo Bay Doors
	 Group: Loss of Entry Capability
APPLICABLE
	
SAFETY	 REOUIREMENTSo
201.2	 - Failure Tolerance, Catastrophic Hazards
202.2d - Deployment Preventing Door Closure
205
	 - Contingency Return of Payloads
DESCRIPTION	 OF HAZARGe
Orbiter unable to close cargo bay doors for re-entry because
SCE payload blocks opening.
HAZARD	 CAUSESI
1.	 Unable to retract truss and unable to jettison SCE payload package;
2.	 Possible causes of loss of jettison capability are:	 Orbiter latch
failure, RMS failure, or failure to release tip masses.
HAZARD
	
CONTROLSt
The combination of retraction and jettison must be 2 failure tolerant
to comply with requirements.
SAFETY
	
VERIFICATION	 METHOOSt
ORIG111AR KCE
1
OF POOR QUALITY
STATUSg
Open - pending detailed design and safety review
CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PHASE	 II
Payload Organization
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS Operator
JSC Form 5422$ (rSO 16)	 NASA-3S('
A-24
D
iN0.
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT
•
Me -11
PAYLOAD
SCE
PHASE
0
suesysTeM
	
Mechanical
DATE
4-29-82
HAZARD TITLE
Inadvertent Initiation of Pyrotechnic Separation Bolt
APPLICAOLE	 SAFETY	 REOUIREMENTSt
210 - Pyrotechnics
DESCRIPTION	 OF	 HAZAROI
Inadvertent detonation of an electro explosive device could result in an explosion
because of direct or secondary effects.
a.	 Early initiation after installation would result in release of the tip mass
which is discussed in Report Me-4
b.	 Failure of the separation bolt to operate would result in payload bay door
blockage discussed in Report Me-10
HAZARD	 CAUSES,
1.	 Inadvertent initiation of electro explosive device from RFI/electrostatic
discharge
2.	 Premature initiation of electro explosive device due to premature power
application.
HAZARD	 CONTROLSo
1.	 The electro explosive device used for the system must be the NASA standard
initiator (NSI)
2.	 The control unit harness must be tested for stray voltage prior to NSI
connection
3.	 The command circuit must be 2 F/T to prevent inadvertent initiation
SAFETY
	
VERIFICATION	 METHODSi
OF uQ'Ch' QUC^UrYj
STATUSi
Open - pending detailed design and safety review
CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PHASE	 11
Payload Organization
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS Operator
a
4
i
JSC Farm 5420 re0 i01	 NASA•JSC
A-25
Z! 0
NO.
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT S-1
PAYLOAD PHASE
SCE 0
SuSSySTEm A T —1
Structures	
TO
2-82
HAZARD TITLE
Failure of Beam Structure	 Group:	 Collision
APPLICABLE	 SAFETY	 REQUIREMENTSo
201.2 - Failure Tolerance
	 Catastrophic Hazards	 208.2	 Emergency Landing Loads
202.2 - Control of Hazardous Functions, Catastrophic 	 208.3	 Stress Corrosion
208.1 - Structural Design
DESCRIPTION
	
OF	 HAZARD$
Structural failure of beam causes collision with Orbiter.
HAZARD
	
CAUSESt
1.	 Material defects	 5.	 Load distribution not conforming
2.	 Stress corrosion	 to analytic prediction causinglocal overstress
3.	 Corrosion due to dissimilar
	 6.	 Failure of hinge to lock
metals and exposure
4.	 Undetected damage
	
7.	 Impact by RMS
HAZARD	 CONTROL$i
1.	 A fracture control analysis should be performed to preclude failures
caused by propagation of existing flaws.
2.	 Whenever practical stress corrosion resistant materials (per Mr-SC
Spec - 522A) should be used.
(Continued on attached page)
SAFETY	 VERIFICATION	 METHODSi
('^OW
I ,
STATUSi
Open - peneing detailed aesign and safety review
CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PHASE	 11
Payload Organization
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS Operator
ijSC Form 5/428 (Fab 78)	 NASA-JS(
A-26
r,.w
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT
S-1
Payload - SCE
Subsystem - Structures
Hazard Title - Failure of Beam Structure	 Group: Collision
HAZARD CONTROLS:
	
(Continued)
3. Impression marking of parts should be prohibited to minimize
potential stress corrosion.
4. Faying surfaces of dissimilar metal should receive surface
protection to eliminate corrosion.
5. Appropriate structural safety factors should be applied to
the design of the beam.
6. Beam geometry is 1 F/T.	 ?
1
7. RMS is Shuttle-provided and will be flight-proven prior to 	 1
this mission.
i
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NO.
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT ST2
PAYLOAD PHASE
SCE 0
SUBSYSTEM DATE
Structures 2-82
mAZAR0 TITLE
Failure of Support Structure
	 Group:	 Collision
APPLICABLE	 SAFETY	 REOUIREMENTSi
201.2 - Failure Tolerance, Catastrophic Hazards
	 208.2 - Emergency Landing Loads
202.2 - Control of Hazardous Functions, Catastrophic
	 208.3 - Stress Corrosion
208.1 - Structural Design
DESCRIPTION	 OF	 HAZAROs
Structural failure of beam sdpport structure causes collision
with Orbiter.
HAZARD	 CAUSES.
1.	 Material defects
	 5.	 Load distribution not conforming
2.	 Stress corrosion	 to analytic prediction causing
local overstress
3.	 Corrosion due to dissimilar	 6.	 Impact by FMS
metals and exposure
4.	 Undetected damage
HAZARD
	
CONTROLSo
1.	 A fracture control analysis should be performed to preclude failures
caused by propagation of existing flaws.
2.	 Whenever practical, stress corrosion resistant materials (per MFSC - 	 r
Spec - 522A) should be used,
(Continued on attached page)
SAFETY	 VERIFICATION	 METHODSt
STATUSt
Open - pending detailed design and safety review
CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PHASE	 II
Payload Organization
STS Operator
APPROVAL P HASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS ()aerator
6
1
i
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT
Payload - SCE	
S-2
Subsystem - Structures
Hazard Title - Failure of Support Structure 	 Group: Collision
HAZARD CONTROLS:
	
(Continued)
3. Impression marking of parts should be prohibited to minimize
potential stress corrosion.
4. Faying surfaces of dissimilar metal should receive surface
protection to eliminate corrosion.
5. Appropriate structural safety factors should be applied to
the design of the support structure.
6. RMS is Shuttle-provided and will be flight-proven prior to
this mission.
t1
E,	 A-29
NO.
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT G-1
PAYLOAD PHASE
SCE 0
SUBSYSTEM ')ATE
Ground Support Equipment 2-82
HAZARD TITLE
Ground Handling Group:	 Collision
APPLICABLE	 SAFETY	 REOUIREMENTSi
201.2 - Failure Tolerance, Catastrophic Hazards 213 - Electrical Systems
202.2 - Contvol of Hazardous Functions 215 - Hazardous Procedures
DESCRIPTION	 OF	 HAZARDi
Loss of control during ground handling of payload causes collision
with STS equipment or personnel.
HAZARD
	 CAUSESi
Uncontrolled movement during installation into the Orbiter.
HAZARD
	 CONTROLSe
1.	 Perform analysis of landing procedures to insure operations
will not jeopardize the Orbiter,
2.	 Ground equipment is Shuttle-provided.
I
SAFETY
	
VERIFICATION	 %IETHODSi
OMWW'11
OF POOH
STATUSt
Open - pending detailed design and safety review
,CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PHASE	 II
Payload Organization
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS Operator
1SC Form 542 8 (Feb 78)	 NASA-JS
€_An3SD
CO
N0.
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT G-2
PAYLOAD PHASE
SCE 0
SUBSYSTEM DATE
Ground Support Equipment 2-82
HAZARD TITLE
Structural Failure of GSE	 Group:	 Collision
APPLICABLE	 SAFETY	 REQUIREMENTSi
201.2 - Failure Tolerance, Catastrophic Hazards
	 208.1 - Structural Design
202.2 - Control of Hazardous Functions, Catastrophic
	 208.3 - Stress Corrosion
DESCRIPTION	 OF	 HAZARD1
Structural failure of ground support equipment causes collision with
STS equipment or personnel.
HAZARD	 CAUSESo
1.	 Material defects
	 5.	 Load distribution not conforming
2.	 Stress corrosion	 to analytic prediction causing
local overstress
3.	 Corrosion due to dissimilar
metals and exposure
4.	 Undetected damage
HAZARD
	
CONTROLSi
1.	 A fracture control analysis should be performed to preclude failures
caused by propagation of existing flaws.
2.	 Whenever practical,	 stress corrosion resistant materials (per MFSC -
Spec - 522A) should be used.
(Continued on attached page)
SAFETY	 VERIFICATION	 METHOOS,
ORIGINAL Pf" C 
OF POOR QUAL6'1 y
3TATUS,
Open - pending detailed design and safety review
CONCURRENCE PHASE	 I PHASE	 II
Payload Organization
STS Operator
APPROVAL PHASE	 III
Payload
Organization STS Operator
r.
)SC Farm 5428 (FOD 78)	 NASA-JSC
E
i
A-31
PAYLOAD HAZARD REPORT
Payload - SCE
	 G••2
Subsystem - Ground Support Equipment
Hazard Title - Structural Failure of GSE 	 Group: Collision
HAZARD CONTROLS:	 (Continued)
3. Impression marking of parts should be prohibited to minimize
potential stress corrosion.
4. Faying surfaces of dissimilar metal should receive surface
protection to eliminate corrosion.
5. Afpropriate structural safety factors should be applied to
the design of the support structure.
6. Ground equipment is Shuttle-provided.
e
cd
A-32 i
